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(METHODO)LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS IN THE WORK OF LEIBNIZ 33
The solution that Leibniz proposes to accord the real continuity of the
world with the real indivisibility of its parts is to eliminate extensiveness as
an essential, definitional attribute of substance.
Conforming to all these exigencies, Leibniz’s substance becomes
multiple (there will be a plurality of substantial individuals). Consequently,
the substances become substantial units, monads (monas in Greek
means “solitary unit”). The monads are independent, simple entities,
“of a unique type, which either exist in a perfect manner, or cease
existing altogether” (Shand, p. 124).
Unlike Spinoza, Leibniz does not consider that the substance should
contain its raison d’etre, but merely
“the reason for its entire nature, that is, all its states” (Shand, p.
124).
It is essential for the individual substance (the monad or the “perfect
being”, as Leibniz calls it) to
Therefore,
“have such a perfect concept as to be able to comprise in itself and
to derive form it all the predicates of the subject that this concept
stands for” (Leibniz(i), p. 76).
“everything that happens inside a monad… [is] a product of its own
inner nature. There is an infinity of monads, each of them a unique
individual type in virtue of the fact that each is being identified with
a unique and infinite list of predicates that comprise its properties”
(Shand, p. 125).
Shand concludes by observing that Leibniz’s solution to the problem of
reconciliation between individualism and holism resides in conceiving the
world as a monadic system.
At this point, it becomes possible for Leibniz to make the existence of
the divine monad a provable matter, on the bases of the contingency of
the world and of the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz conceives the
divinity as a monad that, unlike all other monads, detains in its concept
the predicate of existence. Moreover, if God is possible, then he is also
necessary: