Propeller strike during start-up, Fokker F27... - Onderzoeksraad voor ...

2 ANALYSIS 59
2.1 De-icing boots check 59
2.2 Martinair (ground engineer and mechanic) 60
2.3 Supervision of the Labour Inspectorate 62
2.4 Crew 63
2.5 Environmental aspects 63
2.5.1 Natural light conditions 63
2.5.2 Noise 64
2.5.3 Visual clues 64
2.6 Human factors 64
2.7 Contractual aspects 65
2.8 Co-ordination of the judicial and other investigations 65
3 CONCLUSIONS 67
3.1 Findings 67
3.2 Causes 69
4 RECOMMENDATIONS 70
APPENDICES
A Bravo platform Schiphol Centre 71
B Fokker 50 propeller 72
C Sunlight and shadow diagram 73
D Sun position photograph 74
E Annex B of the contract 75
F Maintenance Operations Exposition, page 7 section 3.8 77
G E-mail ‘Voorstel company note Fokker 50’ 78
H Martinair engineering bulletin 79
I 'Evaluation hired personnel' form 80
J The investigation [in Dutch only] 81
In accordance with Annex 13 of the Convention of Chicago as well as the Directive 94/56/EC
of 21 November 1994, establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of civil
aviation accidents and incidents of the Council of the European Union, the purpose of an
investigation conducted under the responsibility of the Dutch Transportation Safety Board
is not to apportion blame or liability.
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