atw 2018-1

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 1 ı January
Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards:
An Application of an Integrated Approach
Howard Chapman, Jeremy Edwards, Joshua Fitzpatrick, Colette Grundy, Robert Rodger
and Jonathan Scott
1 Introduction At the 34 th G8 1 Summit in Japan in 2008 the assembled leaders acknowledged the role of
nuclear power in reducing CO 2 emissions. Part of the final communique stated their commitment to the highest ­possible
standards on “nuclear non-proliferation, safeguards, safety and security” [2]. They recognised that synergies exist
between the 3Ss, (nuclear safety, nuclear security, and nuclear safeguards) and considered it was important that the
separate disciplines are integrated, and that the 3S infrastructure is strengthened through international cooperation
and assistance.
In order to identify the synergies
between the individual specialisms,
international legislation and regulatory
regimes are reviewed before
considering the methods and assessment
techniques used. We then
consider which approaches can contribute
most to improving the integration
of the nuclear 3S, and recount
practical experience of implementing
the Triple S approach.
The aims for the individual
specialisms are:
• Safety is aimed at protecting
workers and the public from the
harmful effects of radiation (or
chemicals or other hazards);
• Security is aimed at preventing
malicious acts that might harm a
nuclear facility (sabotage) or result
in the loss (theft) of nuclear
materials; and
• Safeguards are aimed at preventing
the diversion of nuclear materials
from a civil nuclear programme
to nuclear weapons purposes.
The 3Ss share the same overall objectives
of protecting the public and the
environment from potential hazards.
They use similar principles to achieve
protection; multiple barriers, defence
in depth, decision analysis and consequence
assessment. The regulatory
regimes for all 3Ss use, in the main,
the same processes; assessment, permissioning,
inspection, enforcement
and influence [3].
3.1 Safety
The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Fundamental Safety
Principles document [4] states “The
fundamental nuclear safety objective
is to protect people and the environment
from the harmful effects of
ionising radiation”
“To ensure that facilities are operated
and activities conducted so as to
achieve the highest standards of safety
that can reasonably be achieved,
measures have to be taken:
a) To control the radiation exposure
of people and to prevent the release
of radioactive material to the
environment;
b) To restrict the likelihood of events
that might lead to a loss of control
over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear
chain reaction, radioactive source
or any other source of radiation;
and
c) To mitigate the consequences of
such events if they were to occur”.
3.2 Security
Nuclear security focuses on the prevention,
detection and response to
malicious acts involving or directed at
nuclear material, other radioactive
material, associated facilities, or
associated activities [5]. The objectives
of a State’s Physical Protection
Regime [6] should be:
a) To protect against unauthorised
removal;
b) To locate and recover missing
nuclear material;
c) To protect against sabotage; and
d) To mitigate or minimize effects of
sabotage.
3.3 Safeguards
The objective of Safeguards is to prevent
the diversion of nuclear material
from peaceful use to nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices
(Article III.1 of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT)).
4 Approaches
4.1 Safety
The concept of defence in depth is
fundamental to nuclear safety to
prevent accidents and if prevention
fails, to limit potential consequences.
Nuclear Safety Assessment has a
number of complementary analysis
Safety Security Safeguards
Convention on Nuclear Safety
Convention on Assistance
in the Case of a Nuclear Accident
Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM)
United Nations (UN) International
Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
IAEA Statute
atw-Special „Eurosafe
2017“. In cooperation
with the EUROSAFE
2017 partners,
Bel V (Belgium),
CSN (Spain), CV REZ
(Czech Republic),
MTA EK (Hungary),
GRS (Germany), ANVS
(The Netherlands),
INRNE BAS (Bulgaria),
IRSN (France),
NRA (Japan),
JSI (Slovenia),
LEI (Lithuania),
PSI (Switzerland),
SSM (Sweden),
SEC NRS (Russia),
SSTC NRS (Ukraine),
VTT (Finland),
VUJE (Slovakia),
Wood (United
Kingdom).
Revised version
of a paper presented
at the Eurosafe,
Paris, France, 6 and
7 November 2017.
1) Canada, France,
Germany, Italy,
Japan, Russia,
United Kingdom,
United States
and European
Commission
Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT)
21
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY
2 International statues and
agreements
Some of the main international
statutes (written law passed by a
legislative body) and agreements for
the 3Ss is presented in Table 1.
3 Nuclear 3S objectives
By considering the objectives of each
of the 3Ss it becomes clear that they
share the same broad aim and desired
outcomes.
Convention on the Early
Notification of a Nuclear Accident
or Radiological Emergency
Threats to International Peace and
Security caused by Terrorist Acts –
UN Resolution 1373
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
Joint Convention on the Safety
of Spent Fuel Management and
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management
Code of Conduct on the Safety
of Research Reactors
| | Tab. 1.
International Legislation and Agreements.
Safeguards Agreements
Additional Protocols
Non-proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction –
United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) Resolution 1540
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT)
Environment and Safety
Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards: An Application of an Integrated Approach ı Howard Chapman, Jeremy Edwards, Joshua Fitzpatrick, Colette Grundy, Robert Rodger and Jonathan Scott