Churchill, Palestine and Zionism, 1904-1922 - Douglas J. Feith

Palestine and Zionism, 1904-1922 215
future. And the establishment of a strong, free Jewish state astride of the bridge
between Europe and Africa, flanking the land roads to the East, would not be only
an immense advantage to the British Empire, but a notable step towards the
harmonious disposition of the world among its peoples. 9
future. And the establishment of a strong, free Jewish state astride of the bridge
between Europe and Africa, flanking the land roads to the East, would not be only
an immense advantage to the British Empire, but a notable step towards the
harmonious disposition of the world among its peoples. 9
Churchill, however, dropped this paragraph from the final draft. His
secretary apologized to Rabbi Gaster: "To his great disappointment and
regret, he [Churchill] finds that he must postpone the expression of the
opinions set out in [this paragraph] ... until he returns to a position of
greater freedom and less responsibility."lo
IMPERIAL CALCULATIONS
Whatever their differences on specific questions of policy, upholders of
the British Empire like Balfour and Churchill shared a general outlook on
Britain's role as a liberal imperial power in world affairs. Their conviction
was that a great power had responsibilities in the world, a high calling to
rule less advanced peoples and to assist them to achieve progress. According
to this view, a great power extended civilization, improving the government
and the material well-being of lands that the natives had failed
to develop. Treasuring its credibility, it made commitments cautiously and
appreciated the price to be paid for not keeping them. A great power's
moral confidence and self-respect-the conviction that it acted rightfully,
fairly, and from virtuous motives-were chief elements of its national
power. To be sure, not everyone in Britain embraced this outlook and not
everyone who did applied it consistently. But this Kiplingesque sense of
imperial duty, honor, and opportunity was a potent factor in British
foreign policy debates in the period.
In the Victorian era, as in all previous eras, statesmen generally assumed
the inevitability of future war. It was not common, as it is today, to think
of diplomacy as a means to ensure perpetual peace or to create a permanently
stable balance of military power. Diplomacy's purpose was to
maneuver one's country into a good position for the next war. Wars were
understood to have consequences; losers lost, without a right of return to
the status quo ante, and victors gained, without apology. This reflected
the immutable reality of power politics. And, when the defeated parties
9 Martin Gilbert, Exile and Return: The Struggle for a Jewish Homeland (Philadelphia:
]. B. Lippincott, 1978), 69, emphasis in original.
10 Michael]. Cohen, Churchill and the Jews (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 34.