Churchill, Palestine and Zionism, 1904-1922 - Douglas J. Feith

Palestine and Zionism, 1904-1922 253
or the other. ... In the case of Palestine these sympathies are rather obviously
with the Arabs, who have hitherto appeared to the disinterested observer to have
been the victims of the unjust policy forced upon them by the British Government.
He assured his troops that the government "would never give any support
to the more grasping policy of the Zionist Extremist, which aims at
the Establishment of a Jewish Palestine in which Arabs would be merely
tolerated" and "would certainly not countenance a policy which made
Palestine for the Jews what England is for the Englishmen."122
Three days later, on the fourth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration,
Arab attacks on Jews in Jerusalem resulted in the death of four Jews and
one Arab. Samuel meanwhile had decided not to enforce the fines imposed
on the Arabs responsible for the May riots in Jaffa. That this was likelier
to encourage than prevent additional violence was clear to the Middle East
department, and not just to Meinertzhagen. Department head Shuck burgh
wrote on October 28 that Samuel was "afraid," but it is an "intolerable"
doctrine that "offenders may defy us with impunity." On 17 November,
Churchill noted: "Samuel should be held stiffly up to the enforcement
of the fines on Jaffa" for "[w]e cannot allow expediency to govern the
administration of justice.,,123
At this time, however, Churchill was generally disinclined to engage
in Palestine affairs. 124 He assured his troops that the government "would never give any support
to the more grasping policy of the Zionist Extremist, which aims at
the Establishment of a Jewish Palestine in which Arabs would be merely
tolerated" and "would certainly not countenance a policy which made
Palestine for the Jews what England is for the Englishmen."122
Three days later, on the fourth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration,
Arab attacks on Jews in Jerusalem resulted in the death of four Jews and
one Arab. Samuel meanwhile had decided not to enforce the fines imposed
on the Arabs responsible for the May riots in Jaffa. That this was likelier
to encourage than prevent additional violence was clear to the Middle East
department, and not just to Meinertzhagen. Department head Shuck burgh
wrote on October 28 that Samuel was "afraid," but it is an "intolerable"
doctrine that "offenders may defy us with impunity." On 17 November,
Churchill noted: "Samuel should be held stiffly up to the enforcement
of the fines on Jaffa" for "[w]e cannot allow expediency to govern the
administration of justice.,,123
At this time, however, Churchill was generally disinclined to engage
in Palestine affairs. His official attention focused chiefly on the Irish
settlement, in which he had a major hand.125 With Churchill's mind elsewhere,
Palestine policy became an arena of active domestic political combat
124 His official attention focused chiefly on the Irish
settlement, in which he had a major hand.125 With Churchill's mind elsewhere,
Palestine policy became an arena of active domestic political combat
122 WSC IV C 1659-60. 123 WSC IV 636-7.
124 Churchill organized a conference in London to bring Arab and Zionist delegations
together in November, but then canceled it. When it was rescheduled, he decided not
to attend and sent Shuck burgh in his stead. Though he received protests about the
unprofessionalism, bigotry, and disloyalty exhibited in the Congreve circular, Churchill
let it pass without rebuke, marking the file on the subject: "no action required." WSC
IV C 1059 n. 1; see also WSC IV 641. On November 16, 1921, Meinertzhagen wrote
in his diary, "Obstruction to Zionism is no longer impelled by Arab ideas and Arab
pressure. [It] is now captained by British Officials, who have constituted themselves as
advisers to the Arab delegation here in London, and who are working against Zionism
in Palestine. It is political sabotage of the worst kind. At the present moment it is impossible
for the Arab delegation to voice the views of the People of Palestine. They are
instead voicing the view of the handful of ex-Palestine Officials in London. This makes
negotiations between the Arab Delegation and the Zionists manifestly impossible ....
Winston does not care two pins .... He is reconciled to a policy of drift. He is too
wrapped up in Home Politics" (Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 112).
125 Diplomacy was freeing up the services of the fearsome Black and Tans-"a pretty tough
lot" (Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 114 [December 19, 1921, entry])-the force
that Churchill as war secretary had originally dispatched to suppress the Irish revolt. Now,
as a cost-saving measure that did not require reliance on Jewish gendarmes, Churchill
arranged to use Black and Tans, including the commanding general, to keep the peace