Churchill, Palestine and Zionism, 1904-1922 - Douglas J. Feith

228 DOUGLAS J. FEITH
This last remark was to reverberate problematically over the years.
Within the British government, not all the pro-Zionists favored Britain's
accepting the mandate for Palestine. And not all the anti-Zionists
favored Britain's renouncing Palestine. The military administration there,
which reported to Allenby in Egypt, desired by and large to keep the
territory but discard the Balfour Declaration. Some officials said it was
morally wrong for Britain to create a Jewish national home contrary to
the will of the Arab inhabitants. Some worried, as the Russian civil war
raged, about the Jews infecting Palestine with Bolshevik ideology. Some
described Zionism (a la Curzon) as unworkable. One of the pillars of
anti-Zionism was the belief that the Jews could never succeed in defending
themselves physically against the Arabs. In January 1919, Curzon
spoke with Sir Alfred Money, chief of the Palestine administration, and
reported approvingly:
His main point, and that of Allenby, is that we should go slow about the Zionist
aspirations and the Zionist State. Otherwise we might jeopardise all that we have
won. A Jewish Government in any form would mean an Arab rising, and the ninetenths
of the population who are not Jews would make short shrift with the
Hebrews. 48 Hebrews. 48
Setting up a Jewish national home was a daunting responsibility. Even
if practicable, it would be difficult and costly to implement. Discussions
of this problem within the Palestine military administration, however,
were not entirely a matter of unprejudiced analysis. Although some administration
officials undoubtedly were loyal and open-minded, others
were simply unwilling to give the government's pro-Zionist policy a fair
chance of success. These latter officials resolved to oppose their government's
pro-Zionist policy, building a case on their own predictions of
inflexible Arab opposition to the Balfour Declaration. They then applied
themselves to vindicating these predictions.
The Palestine administration did not use suasion or power to encourage
the Arabs to accept the inevitability of a Jewish national home and
reach a modus vivendi with the Jews. Allenby, in fact, barred publication
of the Balfour Declaration in Palestine. In May 1919, General Gilbert
48 Gilbert, Exile and Return, 119. Two and a half years later, on July 26, 1921, the chief
of the imperial general staff, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, met with Cuthbert Evans,
a brigadier general then serving in Palestine. Wilson noted in his diary: "[Evans) is
convinced that the Arabs will cut the throats of the Jews & that our force is quite
insufficient to prevent this." Evans also said it was "preposterous that Sir Herbert Samuel,
a Jew, should be High Commissioner." WSC IV 622.