Churchill, Palestine and Zionism, 1904-1922 - Douglas J. Feith

Palestine and Zionism, 1904-1922 217
evidence. Moreover, Arabia's tribal chiefs were not willing to subordinate
themselves to Hussein. The guerrilla exploits of T. E. Lawrence ("of
Arabia") and Hussein's sons, Abdullah and Feisal, represented a small
return on Britain's large wartime material and political investment in the
HashemitesY The Hejaz forces enjoyed a few successes, but Hussein was
never able to deliver more than a few thousand men at anyone time.
Lawrence wrote after the war: "I have never seen more than 11,000 of
them together, and more often we had only a few hundreds."12 No popular
uprising of Arabs against Turks ever occurred in Palestine, Syria, or
Mesopotamia; the Arabs there, with few exceptions, fought loyally for
their fellow Muslim Ottomans. Not a single Arab unit defected from the
Ottoman army.
Having paid for it richly-financially and politically-cabinet-Ievel
British leaders tended to speak approvingly of the Hashemites' wartime
cooperation. But the Arab contribution overall was far greater on the side
of the Turks than of the Allies.
THE ZIONISTS MAKE THEMSELVES USEFUL
Zionist contributions to Britain's war effort took various forms-technology,
field intelligence, combat manpower, and political propaganda.
Capitalizing on their own farsighted cultivation of political contacts and
uncanny good fortune, the Zionists were able to win for these contributions
high visibility and warm gratitude at the upper rungs of His Majesty's
government. Until the war, Herbert Samuel had had no association with
the Zionist movement. As the first practicing Jew to sit in a British cabinet,
however, he said he felt "a special obligation" to study Zionism and
11 Owing to Lawrence's gift for self-promotion, the Arab revolt had far more popular fame
than military consequence. Hussein sent his first letter to McMahon in July 1915 and the
latter's positive response reflected eagerness for Arab forces to relieve Turkish pressure on
the British forces at Gallipoli. Hussein delayed action against the Turks, however, until
June 1916, months after the British (in January 1916) were forced to abandon Gallipoli.
Though he often overstated the Arab revolt's accomplishments, Lawrence candidly
related the assessment of General Edmund Allenby, commander of the Egyptian expeditionary
force: "[Allenby in late 1917] asked what our railway efforts meant; or rather if
they meant anything beyond the melo-dramatic advertisement they gave Feisal's cause."
T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
Doran, 1936), 380. Writing of Allenby's views as of the final weeks of the war: "The
truth was, he cared nothing for our fighting power, and did not reckon us part of his
tactical strength." Ibid., 539.
12 Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography ofT. E. Lawrence (New
York: Atheneum, 1990), 1061 n. 10.