Churchill, Palestine and Zionism, 1904-1922 - Douglas J. Feith

Palestine and Zionism, 1904-1922 229
Clayton, Allenby's chief political officer (who had been among Cairo's
chief Arab revolt strategists during the war and later became chief of staff
to the Palestine high commissioner), conveyed to London a report from
General Money urging the government to abandon the Balfour Declaration;
Clayton concurred. 49 Soon thereafter, Meinertzhagen reported that
British officials in Palestine "are encouraging the Arabs to oppose Zionism"
and that "the Jews regard the Administration as half-hearted regarding
the National Home." Meinertzhagen concluded that Palestine's
"political state ... is unhappy ... due to lack of a clear policy" and "failure
to make it abundantly clear that the National Home is the declared
policy of H. M. G." He urged that the local administration "be purged
of those elements hostile to Zionism. ,,50
In early August, having received counsel from Herbert Samuel and
Meinertzhagen,sl Balfour responded to Clayton and Money, cabling Cairo
to instruct the Palestine administration to tell the Arab leaders that the
government's pro-Zionist declaration was a "chose jugee" (decided policy)
and that continued agitation against it would harm the country without
affecting the policy.52 Cairo did not act on the foreign office cable.
Later that month, the cabinet considered whether to accept the mandate
for Palestine. Lloyd George prevailed. One participant noted: "The
49 Stein Balfour Declaration, 645.
50 Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 22 (June 14, 1919, entry).
51 At the end of July, Balfour met with Meinertzhagen: "[Balfour's) reasons for being a
Zionist were complex, but were mainly based on the unsatisfactory position of the Jews
in the world. There were many and powerful opponents to Zionism, headed by several
rich and influential Jews. Their main argument was that a race which had for so long been
parasites on other nations was not likely to succeed in an enterprise which was entirely
Jewish ....
"Balfour went on to say that he himself was not in favour of a British Mandate over
Palestine, but that he would not oppose it. The Prime Minister was very anxious to secure
a British Mandate for purely sentimental reasons.
"He defined the policy of H. M. G. as follows: All development, industrial schemes
of all kinds, and financial assistance must be based on the principle that Zionists are the
Most-favoured Nation in Palestine ....
"To those who argued that the fate of Palestine should be decided by a Plebiscite, in
which case the Arabs would have an overwhelming majority, he would reply that in any
Palestine Plebiscite, the Jews of the world must be consulted; in which case he sincerely
believed that an overwhelming majority would declare for Zionism under a British
Mandate.
"I said I did not think that Arab opposition to Zionism would last for an instant in
any obstructive form, if we once made it clear that Palestine was to be the National Home
of the Jews and that H. M. G. was determined to see its policy through. Arab opposition
would therefore be futile and would not be tolerated. He promised to dispatch a telegram
in this sense to General Allenby." Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 24-6 (July 30,
1919, entry).
52 Stein, Balfour Declaration, 646-7.