Churchill, Palestine and Zionism, 1904-1922 - Douglas J. Feith

250 DOUGLAS J. FEITH
Lloyd George and Balfour "both said that by the Declaration they always
meant an eventual Jewish State." Churchill discussed the difficult situation
arising from the declaration "which was opposed by the Arabs,
9/1 Oths of the British officials on the spot, and some of the Jews in Palestine
... a poor country in which destitute emigrants could not be dumped."
Weizmann criticized the "representative Government project." Lloyd
George then spoke directly to Churchill: "You mustn't give representative
Government to Palestine." Churchill replied that" questions affecting the
JNH [Jewish national home] would be eliminated from the purview of
the representative Government." Weizmann said this was impossible. After
some additional comments, Lloyd George noted that Weizmann wanted
to know "whether we are going to keep our pledges." Weizmann said,
"yes," Balfour then nodded, and Lloyd George told Weizmann: "You
must do a lot of propaganda. Samuel is rather weak.,,114
BALFOUR DECLARATION:
REVIEWED, REDEFINED, REAFFIRMED
Thus, the prime minister, who harassed Churchill continually to cut garrison
expenses, catered to Weizmann and sympathized not at all with
Churchill's desire to keep Palestine quiet through cooperation with the
local authorities. By supporting Samuel, a Jew who early in the Great War
had established pro-Zionist credentials, Churchill antagonized the Zionist
leadership. Yet, as the Balfour Declaration's chief official defender, the
colonial secretary suffered imprecations from the Arabs and their camp,
which comprised the bulk of the British military and the Palestine administration
and important voices in Parliament and the pressYs Under the
circumstances, Churchill concluded that he needed political cover and
demanded a cabinet review of Palestine policy.
In preparation for that review, Major Young, stimulated by Meinertzhagen,116
proposed a package deal. As a concession to the Arabs, the
high commissioner's advisory council would be established on an elective
(i.e., "representative") rather than appointive basis. The measures to satisfy
Zionist concerns were several. Most important: "Any officials, whether
114 WSC IV C 1559-60.
115 For example, in October 1921, General Congreve told Major Young that "he and all
his officers" thought that the government was "in the hands of the Zionist Organization"
and the Middle East department was "pursuing an unfair policy in favour of the
Jews." WSC IV 636.
116 See Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 106-9 (August 2 and 4, 1921, entries).