september - october - Fort Sill

THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL
However, when cornered, he fights with the desperation of a wild animal.
The armament of these people is limited to the rifle, Mauser or Lebel,
with an occasional grenade; machine guns and artillery are very rare. His
tactics consist in holding a single irregular line with riflemen protected in
short trenches or behind boulders. Ordinarily there are no reserves, but it is
quite common to encounter isolated scouts in front of the defense line, who
with a few shots slow up the march of the French and force a deployment.
The theatre of operations is mountainous, very rugged and broken. The
climate is noted for its extremes. During the summer the country is a torrid
desert without water, while in the winter heavy rains turn the dry stream
beds into torrents, and the surface of the hills into slippery mud. Roads are
nonexistent in the mountain and all transport must follow the mule paths
and dry stream beds. The existing maps are poor, and even where accurate
it is often impossible to identify points on the terrain due to its broken
character.
Faced with these obstacles the French allotted for the offensive of
September, 1925, seven divisions, which with the addition of corps troops,
totalled 102 battalions, 56 batteries and 18 aviation squadrons. The artillery
was of all types; pack, horse-drawn, portee and tractor-drawn and ranged in
calibre from 65 to 155 mm.
The procurement of artillery information was facilitated by the wide
choice of untroubled observation posts, available in the mountains, but at
the same time, the necessity for complete and accurate information was
correspondingly increased. The wide front to be covered, the few guns
available and the colossal difficulties of ammunition supply made it
essential that not a round be wasted. Mapfiring was out of the question, and
accurate, economical adjustments were the rule of the day. It was important
for battalion and higher artillery commanders to keep themselves
accurately informed of the enemy and the terrain so that no fire be wasted
on trifling objectives and that the very best available routes be used in an
advance.
For the transmission of messages, the telephone, the heliograph, and
the messenger were the most reliable. Visual signalling resumed a great
importance whereas radio and aeroplane communications generally
failed.
As in all other campaigns, the employment of the artillery rested largely on
the tactics of the infantry. Here was an approach made during which there was
no danger from enemy artillery, permitting the French to move all their own
guns at the same time rather than by echelon. Slowed up by the shots from the
Riffian scouts, the French would deploy at once and contact with the enemy
position would quickly follow. The most successful type of manœuvre was
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