september - october - Fort Sill

FOREIGN MILITARY JOURNALS
a flank movement which would generally dislodge the Riffians but a rapid
pursuit was demanded if any material results were to be gained. Such
tactics called on the artillery for a quick occupation of position, selection of
targets and rapid adjustment of fire.
In meeting the above requirements, the first problem that presented
itself to the commander of the divisional artillery was the distribution of his
force. Several schemes were tried out but Captain Courbis is of the opinion
that the most effective was the assignment of one battalion (two if
available) of pack artillery to each infantry brigade and the retention of any
horse-drawn or motorized units under the direct control of the commander
of the divisional artillery. This plan seems to have been the happy mean
between rigid control of all the artillery under the artillery commander and
complete decentralization in which all the batteries were separated from
each other and attached direct to infantry units.
The primary fire mission of the artillery was direct support of the
infantry by concentrations of short, accurate bursts of fire. Such missions
as counter-preparations, destructive and interdiction fires were negligible
or nonexistent, and although harassing fire frequently had good moral and
political effect on wavering tribes. Assignment of targets was made by the
battalion commander to his battery commanders by verbal description over
the telephone, by written message accompanied by a panoramic sketch, or
by a personal visit to the captain's observation post. Panoramic sketches
were often resorted to and were in general of more value than maps for
artillery fire due to the difficulty of identifying the features of the ground
with those on the map. Joint battery and battalion observation posts were
not advocated, as tending to confusion.
Gun positions were of two classes: either on top of a crest beside the
observation post, or in the valley directly behind. The latter was preferred as
in a mountainous and roadless country, it is usually easier to lay a telephone
line of a half mile, or even more to the top of a ridge, than it is to haul four
guns to the top of said ridge and transport the ammunition which they may
consume. In the conduct of fire it was necessary to obtain a rapid salvo
adjustment with a deep bracket, followed by progressive volleys. Unless this
was done, there was no chance of striking a mobile enemy who would
quickly find shelter. Precision fire was in almost all cases futile. On the other
hand, choice of targets could not be left indiscriminately to subordinate
commanders, inclined to waste precious rounds on fleeting but unimportant
targets, picturesquely described, as the desire to go rabbit shooting.
In the matter of ammunition, high-explosive shell was preferred. The
difficulty of corrector adjustment when observation post is not in the
plane of site; the constant corrector changes entailed in fire
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