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ducting the expedition, or duty to my
King and Country, appear to be deficient
in me."
« My letter to general Blalteney,
sent by Mr. Harvey, tho' never delivered,
for reafons immediately to Sollow,
will, I think, evince this truth."
" My first care, after coming in
sight of the port, was to know the
true state of the harbour and garrison,
to encourage the General and soldiers,
by acquainting him that l was arrived
to his succour, and desiring to know
hoc.' it might most effectually be put in
execution"
" Thus then l hope all things will
appear to the Court, to be well conducted
to the time of the French fleet's
appearing in view ; when, on feeing
the enemy, considerationa of another
nature took place, and it became necessary
to defer the execution of all resolutions
which l had taken since I
saw Mahon, and to recal the men of
war which I had dispatched to reconnoitre
the harbour, and procure intelligence
from General Blakeney. Ic
was now co no purpose to know the
state ol the citadel and harbour, before
l had engaged the French fleet ; I had
no Soldiers to land, but what made
Part of the compliment of my shipr,
2nd ferved as marines ; and if I had
i -en provided with them, ic would
have been absolutely imprudent to
Jiave landed them before the engagement
with tire enemy, and thereby
render that force Iefs, which was already
too little for the intent it ought
to have been sent upon. Landing the
troops would have rendered the fleet
unlit for action, and obliged it to flee
before the enemy. Had I behaved in
that manner, Such a preposterous act
could not have Sailed rendering me
justly delinquent, and unequal to the
command I presided in.''
" I was very Sensible that iS Succels
the consequence of engaging the
1 rench, that l should have it more in
lay power to relieve the citadel, as
sar as landing the troops, whicb ferved
marines, could effect it, But l
A F Y. sr^s ^
sufpected also, and with reason, that
l might probably be rendered unable
to keep the 'Seas (tho' I obtained t^e
victory) and therefore prey ented from
effectually Succouring the citadel."
" So far all, 1 hope, will appear
to the Court to ha'e been cor. ducted
with knowledge and prudence."
" Am I deserving of blame, for not
Seeking the enemy in the disabled condition
l was in aSter the engagement
?'*
« To what purpose would this Second
engagement have been attempted,
with a fleet originally So greatly
inSerior to the French, and now rendered
much more So by the damages
received in the late battle ? A total defeat,
in all probability, is the anfwer
ofteafon ; and ifM. La Galisfonniette
had fought it, which providentially he
did not, it is a reasonable presumption
that the whole English fquadron would
have perished, or fallen a prey to the
French ; since there was no port to
shelter them. W hereas, had l been
in the Mediterranean before the arrival
of the French at Minorca, a defeat
on my side even might have Saved the
island : l could have then Saved m y
shattered remains in Mahon, and the.'
Conquered at sea, by means of the sailors
and soldiers, have preserved St.
Philip's, and probably the island.
Thus a deleat ol our fleet, had it been
timely sent out, vrtusd have done mote
service than a victory after Sr philips
was invested."
'* It has heen the fettled rule ol all
generals, that no commander should
ever risque an engagement, but when
there is greater expectations to gain by
a victory, than to lose by a defeat,"
" When then, from the inferiority
of the English, nothing could be
reasonably expected but misfortue
and disgrace; or, if by the greatest
efforts of good fortune, victory should
declare sor our fleet, that no advantage
could be drawn from it; when
the risque ol losing the whole fleet
was the result of an unanimous council
of war ; and tbe nation, consider-
F ing