Final Risk Analysis - Biosecurity New Zealand
Final Risk Analysis - Biosecurity New Zealand
Final Risk Analysis - Biosecurity New Zealand
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2000). However, in the vast majority of cases there are no or only mild clinical signs<br />
(Vermunt and Parkinson 2000).<br />
The acute infections are of short duration and virus is excreted in nasal secretions for up to 14<br />
days after infection. Viraemia is hard to detect (Babuik et al 2004) but can occasionally occur<br />
(van Oirschot 2004). Virus spreads to the conjunctiva and trigeminal ganglion by neuronal<br />
axonal transport (van Oirschot 2004). Many animals become chronically infected latent<br />
carriers of the virus in their trigeminal or sacral ganglia, and may excrete the virus<br />
periodically when they are stressed (Babuik et al 2004; van Oirschot 2004). Semen may be<br />
infected with virus and insemination with such semen causes infection in recipient females<br />
(Parsonson and Snowdon 1975; Schlafer et al 1990; van Oirschot 1995b).<br />
BHV-5 associated with encephalitis (Wentink et al 1993) has been described in Australia<br />
(Brake and Studdert 1985), USA (Barenfus et al 1963; Delhon et al 2003), Canada (Gough<br />
and James 1975), and Europe (Bartha et al 1969; Moretti et al 1964) but not in <strong>New</strong> <strong>Zealand</strong>.<br />
10.1.5. Hazard identification conclusion<br />
Abortifacient strains of IBR/IPV virus are exotic notifiable organisms and they are commonly<br />
present in chronic carrier animals. These organisms are therefore classified as potential<br />
hazards. However, since practical tests are not available to identify abortifacient strains in the<br />
laboratory it is necessary to regard all BHV 1.1 and BHV 1.2a strains as potential hazards.<br />
BHV-5 is also exotic and is regarded as a potential hazard.<br />
10.2. RISK ASSESSMENT<br />
10.2.1. Entry assessment<br />
Recently infected cattle may excrete the virus in nasal secretions and aerosols for up to 14<br />
days after infection (Babuik et al 2004). Carriers of the virus may periodically excrete virus<br />
particularly during periods of stress (Babuik et al 2004; van Oirschot 2004). The likelihood of<br />
entry of virus in the commodity is therefore considered to be non-negligible.<br />
10.2.2. Exposure assessment<br />
Imported animals are likely to be kept in herds with indigenous <strong>New</strong> <strong>Zealand</strong> cattle and the<br />
likelihood of exposure of naïve indigenous cattle is high. Infection could be spread by contact<br />
(Babuik et al 2004) or by insemination or natural mating using infected bulls (Parsonson and<br />
Snowdon 1975; Schlafer et al 1990;van Oirschot 1995b).<br />
10.2.3. Consequence assessment<br />
Introduction of abortifacient strains of BHV1.1 or 1.2a or strains of BHV 5 is likely to result<br />
in outbreaks of abortion or encephalitis. This would have a negative effect on the economy of<br />
the cattle industry and individual farmers.<br />
The virus does not infect humans and therefore the consequences for people are negligible.<br />
Other ruminants can possibly be infected with BHVs since they have been found to have<br />
antibody to the virus. However, the antibody that has been detected may be cross-reacting<br />
antibody as in the case of deer infected with cervine herpesvirus (Motha and Jenner 2001;<br />
MAF <strong>Biosecurity</strong> <strong>New</strong> <strong>Zealand</strong> Import <strong>Risk</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong>: Cattle from Australia, Canada, the EU & the USA ● 33