Final Risk Analysis - Biosecurity New Zealand

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Tisdall and Rowe 2001). No significant disease has been described in other ruminants. The consequences for the environment are therefore assessed to be negligible. The consequences of importation of cattle are non-negligible for the cattle industry. The likelihood that there will be consequences for human health or the environment is considered to be negligible. 10.2.4. Risk estimate Since entry, exposure, and consequence assessments are all non-negligible, the risk estimate for exotic bovine herpesviruses is non-negligible, and they are classified as a hazard in the commodity. Therefore, risk management measures can be justified. 10.3. RISK MANAGEMENT 10.3.1. Options Serological tests are not specific for sub-types of herpes viruses and it will not be possible to distinguish between the antibodies induced by BHV1.2a, BH1.1 or BHV5 strains from other strains of BHVs. From a practical viewpoint it will be necessary to consider any animal reacting positively to an IBR test to be potentially infected with an exotic strain of virus. The OIE Terrestrial Animal health Code does not discuss strains of bovine herpes viruses but instead considers the clinical syndromes of IBR and IPV. There are, therefore, no international risk management standards that are directly applicable although it is reasonable to extrapolate from the Code to the exotic strains of concern here. The Code recommends that animals destined for IBR/IPV free herds, should come from an IBR free herd (as defined in the Code), should be isolated in a quarantine station for at least 30 days, and should be subjected to two serological tests at an interval of not less than 21 days (OIE 2006). One or a combination of the following measures could be considered in order to effectively manage the identified risk. • Cattle for import into New Zealand could be imported from countries that are free from BHV 1.1 and BHV 1.2a, and come from herds that have no history of encephalitis caused by BHV 5. • Cattle could come from a herd that is free from IBR/IPV as defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code. • Cattle could be placed in quarantine for the 30 days prior to export and during this time be submitted to 2 serological tests for IBR/IPV with an interval of not less than 21 days between tests, with negative results. The serological test used could be an OIE recommended test or one approved by MAF. 34 ● Import Risk Analysis: Catlle from Australia, Canada, the EU & the USA MAF Biosecurity New Zealand
References References marked * have been sighted as summaries in electronic media. Babuik TA, Van Drunen Littel-van den Hurk S, Tikoo SK (2004). Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis / pustular vulvovaginitis and infectious pustular balnoposthitis. In: Coetzer JAW, Tustin RC, (eds). Infectious Diseases of livestock. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 875-86. Barenfus M, Delliquadri CA, McIntyre RW, Schroeder RJ (1963). Isolation of Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis Virus from Calves with Meningoencephalitis. Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Assocition, 143, 725-8. Bartha A, Haidu G, Aldassy P, Paczolay G (1969). Occurrence of encephalmyelitis caused by infectious bovine rhinotracheitis virus in calves in Hungary. Acta veterinaria Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 19, 145- 51.* Brake F, Studdert MJ (1985). Molecular epidemiology and pathogenesis of ruminant herpesviruses including bovine, buffalo and caprine herpesviruses l and bovine encephalitis herpesvirus. Australian Veterinary Journal, 62(10), 331-4. Delhon G, Moraes MP, Lu Z, Afonso CL, Flores EF, Weiblen R, Kutish GF, Rock DL (2003). Genome of bovine herpesvirus 5. Journal of Virology, 77(19), 10339-47. Durham PJK, Forbes-Faulkner JC, Poole WSH (1975). Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis: Experimental attempts at inducing bovine abortion with a New Zealand isolate. New Zealand Veterinary Journal, 23, 93-4. Engels M, Steck F, Wyler R (1981). Comparison of the genomes of infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR) and infectious pustular vulvovaginitis (IPV) strains by restriction enzyme analysis of their genomes. Archives of Virology, 67(2), 169-74. Fairley RA (1996). Respiratory diseases of New Zealand cattle. Surveillance, 23(4), 15-6. Gough A, James D (1975). Isolation of IBR virus from a heifer with meningoencephalitis. Canadian Veterinary Journal, 16(10), 313-4. Horner GW (1990). Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis in New Zealand. Surveillance, 17(2), 25-6. Miller JM, Whetstone CA, Van der Maaten MJ (1991). Abortifacient property of bovine herpesvirus type 1 isolates that represent three subtypes determined by restriction endonuclease analysis of viral DNA. American Journal of Veterinary Research, 52(2), 458-61. Moretti B, Orfei Z, Mondino G, Persechino A (1964). [Isolation of the Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis (Ibr) Virus in Italy. (Preliminary Note)]. Nuovi annali d'igiene e microbiologia, 15, 18-22.* Motha J, Jenner J (2001). Serological relatedness of cervine herpesvirus-1 and bovine herpesvirus-1 and the prevalence of cervine herpesvirus-1 infection in farmed deer in New Zealand. New Zealand Veterinary Journal, 49(4), 162-3. Neilson FJA, Grace PJ (1988). Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis is widespread in New Zealand. Surveillance, 15(2), 29. OIE (2006). Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis /infectious pustular vulvovaginitis. Chapter 2.3.5. In: OIE (ed). Terrestrial Animal Health Code http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/MCode/en_chapitre_2.3.5.htm. OIE, Paris. Parsonson IM, Snowdon WA (1975). The effect of natural and artificial breeding using bulls infected with, or semen contaminated with, infectious bovine rhinotracheitis virus. Australian Veterinary Journal, 51(8), 365-9. MAF Biosecurity New Zealand Import Risk Analysis: Cattle from Australia, Canada, the EU & the USA ● 35
Page 1 and 2: Import Risk Analysis: Cattle from A
Page 3 and 4: MAF Biosecurity New Zealand Pastora
Page 5 and 6: Contents Executive Summary 1 1. Int
Page 7: Contributors to this risk analysis
Page 10 and 11: 1. Introduction This risk analysis
Page 12 and 13: 4.1. PRELIMINARY HAZARD LIST The fi
Page 14 and 15: ORGANISM encephalopathy (BSE) infec
Page 16 and 17: Palyam viruses have been listed as
Page 18 and 19: Animal disease agents • All disea
Page 20 and 21: assessment concludes that the likel
Page 22 and 23: References Durham PJK, Stevenson BJ
Page 24 and 25: (Cybinski and St George 1978; Cybin
Page 26 and 27: 6. Aujeszky’s Disease 6.1. HAZARD
Page 28 and 29: 7. Bluetongue 7.1. HAZARD IDENTIFIC
Page 30 and 31: cattle (either those infected befor
Page 32 and 33: The route of infection for Borna di
Page 34 and 35: antibody production (Muller-Doblies
Page 36 and 37: Teplitsky V, Pitlik S, Richt JA, He
Page 38 and 39: 9.1.5. Hazard identification conclu
Page 40 and 41: 10. Bovine Herpes Viruses 10.1. HAZ
Page 44 and 45: Schlafer DH, Gillespie JH, Foote RH
Page 46 and 47: References References marked * have
Page 50 and 51: was suggested that 7% of foetal dea
Page 52 and 53: An ELISA could be used for antibody
Page 54 and 55: 14. Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Feve
Page 56 and 57: 14.2.4. Risk estimation Since entry
Page 58 and 59: 15. Bovine Ephemeral Fever 15.1. HA
Page 60 and 61: References Murray MD (1997). Possib
Page 62 and 63: 16.2. RISK ASSESSMENT 16.2.1. Entry
Page 66 and 67: Kunjin virus is generally confined
Page 68 and 69: Russell RC (1995). Arboviruses and
Page 70 and 71: and could have severe effects in a
Page 72 and 73: 19. Rabies 19.1. HAZARD IDENTIFICAT
Page 74 and 75: If the disease were to become estab
Page 76 and 77: 20. Ross River and Barmah Forest Vi
Page 78 and 79: 21. Tick Borne Encephalitis 21.1. H
Page 80 and 81: 21.2.4. Risk estimation Since entry
Page 82 and 83: 22. Vesicular Stomatitis 22.1. HAZA
Page 84 and 85: countries. As many facts relating t
Page 86 and 87: Mare cj, mead dg (2004). Vesicular
Page 90 and 91: disease (vCJD). Up to the 4 th of N
Page 92 and 93:
• Consistent with Article 2.3.13.
Page 94 and 95:
25. Anthrax 25.1. HAZARD IDENTIFICA
Page 96 and 97:
25.3. RISK MANAGEMENT 25.3.1. Optio
Page 98 and 99:
26.1.5. Hazard identification concl
Page 100 and 101:
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/MCode
Page 102 and 103:
Page 104 and 105:
Wood PR, Corner LA, Rothel JS, Bald
Page 106 and 107:
References References marked * have
Page 108 and 109:
ole they play as pathogens is uncer
Page 110 and 111:
29.2. RISK ASSESSMENT 29.2.1. Entry
Page 112 and 113:
Ayling RD, Bashiruddin SE, Nicholas
Page 114 and 115:
Mackie DP, Finlay D, Brice N, Ball
Page 116 and 117:
haemagglutination test are seldom u
Page 118 and 119:
OIE (2006). Haemorrhagic septicaemi
Page 120 and 121:
Salmonella typhimurium is endemic i
Page 122 and 123:
Page 124 and 125:
32. Leptospirosis 32.1. HAZARD IDEN
Page 126 and 127:
humans have not occurred despite th
Page 128 and 129:
33. Lyme Disease 33.1. HAZARD IDENT
Page 130 and 131:
Burgess EC, Gendron-Fitzpatrick A,
Page 132 and 133:
34. Spirochaetosis (Borrelia theile
Page 134 and 135:
Young calves from both infected and
Page 136 and 137:
OIE (2006). Bovine anaplasmosis. Ch
Page 138 and 139:
phagocytophilia, phagocytophilum, a
Page 140 and 141:
References References marked * have
Page 142 and 143:
organism in semen (Teankum et al 20
Page 144 and 145:
Dagnall GJ, Wilsmore AJ (1990). A s
Page 146 and 147:
Page 148 and 149:
Rousset E, Russo P, Pepin M, Aubert
Page 150 and 151:
40. Babesiosis 40.1. HAZARD IDENTIF
Page 152 and 153:
consequent mortalities and the nece
Page 154 and 155:
41. Sarcocystosis 41.1. HAZARD IDEN
Page 156 and 157:
42. Theileriosis (Theileria annulat
Page 158 and 159:
• Cattle could be imported from c
Page 160 and 161:
suitable to eradicate lice provided
Page 162 and 163:
44. Mange Mites 44.1. HAZARD IDENTI
Page 164 and 165:
One or a combination of the followi
Page 166 and 167:
Hard ticks (Ixodidae) have a life c
Page 168 and 169:
tick could re-infest the same host
Page 170 and 171:
46. Warble Fly 46.1. HAZARD IDENTIF
Page 172 and 173:
Page 174 and 175:
granulosis could occur in cattle. E
Page 176 and 177:
Cattle to be imported into New Zeal
Page 178 and 179:
48. Weed Seeds 48.1. HAZARD IDENTIF
Page 180:
in the digestive tracts of herbivor
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