Surveying & Built Environment Vol. 22 Issue 1 (December 2012)

SBE
16
A Note on British Blockhouses in Hong Kong
The strategic situation remained little
changed for some time. With China
distracted by internal conflict and
European Powers’ resources directed
towards the First World War, the
pressure on Hong Kong was removed.
With those conflicts settled, it was
time to re-evaluate Britain’s strategic
position in Asia.
In the period 1920 to 1922, the Hong
Kong situation was reviewed at length,
with the priority now being on dealing
with a Chinese attack across the New
Territories. It was considered that,
where previously an attack would have
been on a small scale, the improvement
in organisation and tactics within the
Chinese Army could see Hong Kong
facing a force 50,000 strong and,
with the rail line between Canton and
Hankow soon to be completed, a further
30,000 men could be available within
a further two months. Also in 1922,
Britain, the USA and Japan signed the
Washington Treaty that guaranteed
among its articles, in return for other
concessions, that Hong Kong would
not become more heavily fortified.
Whilst this was primarily intended to
cover naval forces and coastal artillery,
it was applied as a ‘status quo’ for all
defences.
Faced with a Chinese force of that
size, it was unlikely that Hong Kong
could be defended for any great length
of time with its existing garrison (5
Infantry Battalions plus Artillery
and Engineers). There were many
advantages in defending a line near the
border (called the Blue Line in defence
plans), but its length, and the length
of the coastline to be defended behind
it made it impracticable. Pending any
increase in the size of the garrison, the
main line of defence would be across
the narrowest part of the Peninsula
between Tide Cove and Gin Drinkers
Bay (Red Line), with a subsidiary line
(Brown Line) between Tide Cove and
Hebe Haven to prevent raids by small
parties under cover of darkness. Whilst
the position of the Red Line would not
prevent long-range artillery fire from
hitting parts of the Island, it was the
only line that could be economically
held for a considerable time by the
existing garrison.
There were three lines of Chinese attack
considered by the defence planners 13 ;
the coast road along the shores of Tolo
Harbour and Tide Cove from Taipo,
a track over Lead Mine Pass towards
Smuggler’s Ridge and Golden Hill,
or another track further west over
the comparatively high pass on the
west side of the Tai-Mo-Shan Ridge
towards the coast, thence towards
Golden Hill. As long as the Royal Navy
had command of the sea, the use on
any scale of either the Coast Road on
the East or an attack on Golden Hill
from the west would be a somewhat
precarious operation for the enemy. The
most likely attack was considered to be
in the centre of the line, in the vicinity
of Smugglers’ Ridge. Delaying tactics
would be employed forward of the line
for as long as possible, to gain time for
local reinforcements to arrive. It was
13 The various lines of attack come from WO 32/5303 Defence of Hong Kong against Chinese Forces
1920-22, in the form of an ‘Appreciation from GOC to War Office’, and subsequent correspondence.
This document also has the earliest seen copy of the map showing the Blue, Brown and Red lines.