Surveying & Built Environment Vol. 22 Issue 1 (December 2012)

envisaged that Hong Kong would have
to rely on itself for two months. There
was no longer any reference to the
Blockhouses.
Considering the requirements for the
line, a reserve, and forces on the Island,
a total of 8 Infantry Battalions were
considered necessary for the defence of
Hong Kong. (WO 32/5303)
A further assessment in 1926 concluded
that Hong Kong could not be defended
without an Air Force, and in any case
the Mainland could not be defended
with the forces available. The whole
defence should be based on retreat
to, and defence of the Island until
reinforcements arrived, probably in
8 weeks, or if necessary destroying
everything of value before being
overrun. In the face of a determined
enemy, even if the reinforcements
arrived, they would probably find the
existing naval, military and commercial
facilities of the Colony so crippled,
if not actually ruined, as to make HK
of little further strategic value for a
considerable period 14 .
In 1931, Japan seized Manchuria
and the three north-eastern “three
provinces” of the Republic of China,
and the next year set up a puppet
government. The following years
brought continuing military conflict
between Japan and China. This aroused
British concern that Japan may soon
become the biggest threat to Hong
Kong, either by land through China,
or amphibious landings on suitable
beaches of the territory. This culminated
14 CO 129/198/12.
Surveying and Built Environment Vol 22, 8-18 Nov 2012 ISSN 1816-9554
in the plans made in 1934/35 to defend
the Mainland along the line basically
chosen in 1922, but strengthened by the
construction of concrete pillboxes along
its length from Gin Drinkers’ Bay in the
west to Hang Hau in the east, (the Inner
Line or Gin Drinkers Line), a distance
of approximately 18 Km. There would
also be a small force forward near the
Hong Kong border with China for
demolitions and delaying, and prepared
machine gun positions on some forward
beaches. Because of its length, and
the limited strength of the garrison
available, it was envisaged that it would
at best protect Hong Kong long enough
for arrival of overseas reinforcements.
dISCuSSIoN
A fuller discussion of how these
very different strategic perceptions
related to the earlier defence line
and its blockhouses awaits further
historical inquiry. Had these already
been abandoned and allowed to fall
into ruin by, say, 1926? If they still
existed, how were their positions
related to the planning for the GDL?
This sort of analysis is needed so that
the relationship between the 1911-
line, the Red Line of post-1922 and
the subsequent GDL has been as fully
explored as it can be. A total of 30 large
blockhouses built and the normal inertia
of military practice mean it is unlikely
that there was no connection at all.
SBE
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