Surveying & Built Environment Vol. 22 Issue 1 (December 2012)

the rest of the world, and then lure the
Japanese Navy to fight a decisive battle
against the main body of the Royal
Navy. 15 Weihaiwei, another British
possession in North China till October
1930, was not seen as a usable base.
Soon after its acquisition in 1901, the
Admiralty had already warned that it
was “strategically too isolated” and
thus the port was not fortified. As T. G.
Otte mentioned, the Naval Staff had
suggested in 1921 that it would not be
possible to retain Weihaiwei during
an Anglo-Japanese War. 16 Thus, Hong
Kong was the most advanced naval
base in a war against Japan. To prevent
Hong Kong from being captured by the
Japanese before the British main fleet
had reached it, it was deemed necessary
to provide adequate defence for the
Colony. However, efforts to augment
Hong Kong defence were marred by
the Washington Treaty signed in 1921,
which had forbidden Hong Kong to
construct or upgrade coastal defence
artillery and naval bases. 17 It was in
this context that numerous studies on
the defensibility of Hong Kong were
conducted.
In 1925, the Governor of Hong Kong
Sir Reginald Stubbs, with the Army
and Navy commanders at Hong
Kong, submitted a report on Hong
Kong defence arguing that Kowloon
Surveying and Built Environment Vol 22, 19-36 Nov 2012 ISSN 1816-9554
and the New Territories should be
given up in face of an enemy attack. 18
Apparently, the Committee of Imperial
Defence in London was not satisfied,
as the Joint Planning Committee was
instructed to submit another report in
December 1927. The JPC consisted of
the personnel from the Army General
Staff, the Department of Naval Plans,
and the Directorate of Operations
and Intelligence of the Air Ministry.
The report anticipated that after
landing at Starling Inlet, the Japanese
would advance along the Kowloon-
Canton Railway towards the Kowloon
Peninsula. To resist such attack, the JPC
put forward two plans with different
scales. A “full scale” plan required a
garrison of 10 battalions, with the main
area of resistance at Tai Mo Shan. A
more practical “reduced scale” plan
involved a garrison of 8 battalions, and
the mission of the garrison would be as
follows:
To provide sufficient force to
ensure an adequate bridgehead
being maintained on the
mainland; this will entail the
retention of the line Tide Cove-
Gin Drinker’s Bay;
To prevent any actual Japanese
landing as long as possible, and
to impose on any force which
15
Bell C (1996), ‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, Journal of
Military History, 60:1, 66.
16
Otte TG, ‘Wee-ah-wee’?: Britain at Weihaiwei, 1898-1930, in Kennedy G (2003), British Naval
Strategy East of Suez, 1900-2000, London, Routledge, 10-18, 26.
17
For the full text of the treaty limiting coastal defence of Hong Kong, see “Conference on the Limitation
of Armament, Washington: Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France,
Italy, and Japan, Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922.” http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/prewar/1922/nav_
lim.html
18
“Defence Against Overseas Attack,” 17/2/1926, CO 129/498.
SBE
23