Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
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B. Respondent's Arguments Are Misplaced<br />
Respondent argues that the denial <strong>of</strong> the requested instruction was proper<br />
because "'a trial court need not give a pinpoint instruction if it merely duplicates<br />
other instructions.' (Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Ca1.4th at p. 220.)" (RB at p. 203.)<br />
However, the instruction requested by appellant's counsel was not duplicative <strong>of</strong><br />
other instructions. None <strong>of</strong>the instructions given at any time in the trial informed<br />
the jury that the evidence giving rise to these instructions related only to Nunez.<br />
The instructions given to the jury at the end <strong>of</strong>trial regarding evidence that<br />
was limited in its scope specifically stated that "at the time" certain evidence was<br />
admitted the jury was instructed that it could not be used for "any purpose other<br />
than the limited purpose for which it was admitted," and the jury could not<br />
consider the evidence for any other purpose. (CALJIC Nos. 207 - Evidence<br />
Limited to One Defendant - and 2.09 Evidence Limited as to Purpose -, given at<br />
37 CT 10725, 10722, 14 RT 3162-3163.)<br />
However, as explained in <strong>Appellant</strong>'s Opening <strong>Brief</strong>(AOB at pp. 183-184),<br />
at the time that the evidence giving rise to CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.05 was<br />
introduced, the jury was not informed <strong>of</strong> its limited use. As a result, the crucial<br />
aspect <strong>of</strong> the instruction appellant was requesting - Le., that the jury be informed<br />
this evidence could only be used against Nunez - had not been explained to the<br />
jury in other instructions. In fact, by restricting limiting instructions to evidence<br />
for which an instruction had been given at the time <strong>of</strong> the admission <strong>of</strong> the<br />
evidence, and by not giving a limiting instruction at the time <strong>of</strong>the introduction <strong>of</strong><br />
the evidence <strong>of</strong> Nunez's alleged behavior, CALJIC Nos. 2.07 and 2.09 as given<br />
had the opposite effect. In other words, because there had been no limiting<br />
instruction given at the time the evidence was introduced, the jury could naturally<br />
assume it was not limited in any way and could therefore be used against<br />
appellant.<br />
Respondent further argues that there was no error or prejudice because the<br />
evidence giving rise to CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.05 involved the actions <strong>of</strong>Nunez.<br />
93