Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

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Respondent nevertheless argues that specific defmitions within the given instruction, combined with other instructions given to the jury, provided adequate instruction on the sentence enhancement. (RB at p. 168-172.) However, respondent does not stop to explain why any reasonable juror would choose to abandon the instruction's clear directive regarding the elements which must be established in order to return a finding on something for which it did not receive instructions, and apply instead the complex and strained construction respondent urges this Court to accept as an adequate instruction. For example, respondent makes a convoluted argument that the jury could have found the missing specific intent element from the instruction's inclusion of the word ''willfully.'' Respondent takes the word ''willfully'' from paragraph two of the instruction and, although he acknowledges it "usually defines a general criminal intent," nevertheless contends that a reasonable juror who read the term ''willfully'' in combination with the definition of "active participation,,2 in paragraph five of the instruction would realize that "'willfully' meant an intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence beyond the charged murder, Le., specific intent." (RB at p. 168.) Alternatively, respondent makes the equally outlandish assertion that a reasonable juror would have deduced the need for the missing specific intent element (1) by taking the aiding and abetting requirement ofthe given instruction; (2) by considering the instructions as a whole and each in light of all the others under CALJIC No. 1.00; and (3) by extracting from the language of CALliC No. 3.01 the conclusion that the mental state required for liability as an aider and abettor is specific intent. (See RB at pp. 168-169.) While respondent's arguments perhaps deserve some credit for creativity, it does not seem very likely that a reasonable juror would parse the given instruction 2 The jury was instructed: "Active participation means that the person (l) must have a current relationship with the criminal street gang that is more than in name only, passive, inactive, or purely technical and (2) must devote all or part of his time or efforts to the criminal street gang." (37CT 10761-10762; 14RT 3182.) 40
in the manner suggested by respondent because the instruction quite clearly said something else. Paragraph two of the instruction, for example, said, in relevant part, "Every person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with the [requisite] knowledge ... and who willfully promotes ... any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, is guilty of ... a crime." It is entirely implausible to argue, as respondent does, that a reasonable juror would set aside the clear language of the instruction and take a detour to the paragraph defining "active participation" so as to read the two paragraphs together to conclude that ''willfully'' really meant "specific intent." Respondent's next contention that the jury was adequately instructed on benefit, direction, or association is equally strained. Respondent asks this Court to fmd the jury knew that in order to return a true fmding it had to first find that appellant committed the charged crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the gang. Respondent argues the jury could have arrived at this missing element through a synthesized reading of CALnC Nos. 1.00, 2.90, 6.50, and 3.01, and because the prosecutor told the jury he had the burden of proving appellants committed the murders to benefit or promote the gang. (RB at p. 170 171.) According to respondent's thinking, a reasonable jury would know from the elements of "active participation" in CALnC No. 6.50 (i.e., that the charged defendant must have a current relationship with a gang and must devote substantial time to the gang), from the reasonable doubt instruction (CALnC No. 2.90), and from the instruction to consider the instructions as a whole and each in light of all the others (CALnC No. 1.00) that it had to fmd beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the murder in association with a gang. However, nothing in the instructions given informed the jury ofthe need to fmd the missing elements. For example, there is nothing in CALnc No. 6.50, which was given to the jury, that would tell the jury that in order find the enhancement true it had to find that appellant intended to benefit the gang, as opposed to committing the crime for his own purposes. Nor is there anything in 41
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TABLE OF CONTENTS APPELLANT WILLIAM
Page 4 and 5: 2. The Pleadings Failed To NotifY A
Page 6 and 7: VI THE JURy FAILED TO FIND THE DEGR
Page 8 and 9: C. Standard OfReview And Prejudice
Page 10 and 11: XIII APPELLANT JOINS IN ALL ISSUES
Page 12 and 13: Mitchell v. Esparza (2003) 540 U.S.
Page 14 and 15: People v. Cruz (2001) 93 Cal.App.4t
Page 16 and 17: People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 2
Page 18 and 19: CALlIC No. 8.31 passim CALJIC No. 8
Page 20 and 21: ARGUMENTS GUILT PHASE ISSUES I THE
Page 22 and 23: the facts indicate that only one de
Page 24 and 25: form finding "personal use" to have
Page 26 and 27: 57 Cal.AppAth 871, 877; 9 Witkin, C
Page 28 and 29: the weapon. Without again recountin
Page 30 and 31: Respondent notes that between the m
Page 32 and 33: In another apparent attempt to just
Page 34 and 35: appellant has repeatedly said, the
Page 37 and 38: not present them to the trial court
Page 39 and 40: In People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Ca
Page 41 and 42: Finally, it must be noted that the
Page 43 and 44: B. The Constitutional Issues Are No
Page 45 and 46: turn relied on the language from Wi
Page 47 and 48: Indeed, in this case the instructio
Page 49 and 50: as the prosecution's first-degree t
Page 51 and 52: F. Conclusion In summary, by failin
Page 53: As appellant explained in the openi
Page 57 and 58: Furthennore, it is well established
Page 59 and 60: Appellant has explained above and i
Page 61 and 62: Cal.App.3d 970, 992.) Instead, resp
Page 63 and 64: 3. Appellant's Did Not Forfeit His
Page 65 and 66: In Argument V of the Opening Brief,
Page 67 and 68: IV IN FAILING TO REDACT PORTIONS OF
Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
Page 71 and 72: have been unreasonable for the jury
Page 73 and 74: shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
Page 75 and 76: find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
Page 77 and 78: THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
Page 79 and 80: Robinson's wounds indicated the sho
Page 81 and 82: caused great bodily injury or death
Page 83 and 84: use enhancement, the statutory lang
Page 85 and 86: 192-193), but fails to explain how
Page 87 and 88: Then we have the words "personal us
Page 89 and 90: trial and had therefore forfeited t
Page 91 and 92: merits of appellant's claim. (AOB a
Page 93 and 94: jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
Page 95 and 96: Respondent argues that another theo
Page 97 and 98: needs to rely on the penalty verdic
Page 99 and 100: may not cross-examine a witness upo
Page 101 and 102: itself to appellant would be improp
Page 103 and 104: B. The Court Erred In Refusing The
Page 105 and 106:
egarding the intent ofthe non-shoot
Page 107 and 108:
B. Respondent's Arguments Are Mispl
Page 109 and 110:
ut is only being allowed for use ag
Page 111 and 112:
x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTI
Page 113 and 114:
XI THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN A
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"guarantee." Appellant is not proce
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v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
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Contreras. Viewed in this context,
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overwhelmingly showed that only one
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XII GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE VERDICT
Page 126 and 127:
Where Juror No. 2211 is concerned,
Page 128 and 129:
The jury in Cruz was given a versio
Page 130 and 131:
PENALTY PHASE ISSUES XIV THE TRIAL
Page 132 and 133:
B. The Flaw In Respondent's Content
Page 134 and 135:
participation ofall jurors. Contrar
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confuse[d]" (Harris) is no more tha
Page 138:
It is submitted that these instruct
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inherent power to review an issue i
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prospective jurors who were found t
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(Id at p. 821.) This court has char
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church. (18RT 4448:4-6,4451:11-14.)
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(18RT 4450:12-14) or her mother (18
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had in fact reached an impasse at t
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There is an impasse. It is hung. Bu
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establishes, for example, that, whe
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and Code of Civil Procedure 233, wh
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a demonstrable reality. The court a
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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT Rule 8.63
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Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

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