Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
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In another attempt to excuse the jury from expressly finding the degree <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>of</strong>fense, respondent notes that the guilt phase jury made a specific finding that<br />
appellants committed the murders with the "specific intent" to "promote, further or<br />
assist" their gang. (RB at p. 95.) This is simply not relevant to the question <strong>of</strong>the<br />
degree <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fense. The gang allegation could attach equally to first or second<br />
degree murder. Therefore the ''true'' finding on the gang allegation does not<br />
indicate that the jury believed this <strong>of</strong>fense was in the first degree.<br />
Finally respondent argues that the jury was presented with three distinct<br />
theories <strong>of</strong> first degree murder. (RB at p. 96.) However, it is not known which, if<br />
any, theory the jury adopted. The fact that three theories <strong>of</strong> first degree murder<br />
were argued is not a substitute for a finding <strong>of</strong>degree by the jury.<br />
Respondent attempts to argue that there was no prejudice because "[t]he<br />
jury expressly found appellants guilty <strong>of</strong> 'first degree' murder on counts 1-2.<br />
(38CT 10941-10944.)" (RB at p. 97.) This supposed "finding" appeared on the<br />
penalty phase verdict form and thus was not "found" until the end <strong>of</strong> the penalty<br />
phase, after the guilt verdicts had been rendered. There are two flaws with this<br />
contention. First, if the jury must fmd the degree <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fense, and not merely<br />
the facts supporting that degree, as this court always held prior to San Nicolas,<br />
then the failure to do so rendered the <strong>of</strong>fenses to be second degree murder as a<br />
matter <strong>of</strong> law at the time <strong>of</strong> the verdicts at the guilt/innocence phase <strong>of</strong> the trial.<br />
From that moment on, the court lacked jurisdiction to even hold a penalty phase<br />
trial, and any subsequent "findings" <strong>of</strong>the penalty phase trial were a nullity. (See<br />
AOB at pp. 123-127.)<br />
Second, the language <strong>of</strong> the penalty phase verdict form states, "having<br />
found the defendant ... guilty <strong>of</strong> first degree murder." This is not a "finding" by<br />
the jury, but an incorrect statement <strong>of</strong> supposed fact on the verdict form, which<br />
was not prepared by the jury at all. The insertion <strong>of</strong> this language in the verdict<br />
form was the result <strong>of</strong> the Deputy District Attorney's interpretation <strong>of</strong> the earlier<br />
verdict and his addition <strong>of</strong> a fact that the jury did not find. Indeed, if respondent<br />
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