Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

appellant contends is necessary, the court did tell the jury to start over "from
scratch." This court affIrmed the result after referring to this aspect of the
instruction. Therefore, ifanything, Proctor stands for the proposition that the jury
must be told to start deliberations anew, even if the exact wording of that
instruction is not cast in stone.
Telling the jury to start from scratch is the same as telling the jury to begin
deliberations anew. Indeed, in many other areas the law shies away from a
talismanic approach which demands that an exact phrase be recited. Rather the
tendency is to allow for wording of instructions or admonitions which incorporate
the essence ofthe message that must be conveyed.
For example, before a suspect is questioned he must be given the
admonitions set forth in Miranda 13 • However, so long as the suspect is informed
of the essence of those warnings, the fact that they are not worded perfectly will
not render a subsequent admission or confession a violation of Miranda so as to
require its suppression. (People v. Bradford (2008) 169 Ca1.AppAth 843,846.)
Likewise, instructions which convey the gist of essential principles to the
jury will often suffIce, even if aspects of the instruction are debatably less than
perfect. (People v. Wimberly (1992) 5 Ca1.App.4th 773, 793.)
Respondent argues that the trial court did instruct the jury that "[y]our
function now" is to deliberate ''with'' the replacement juror, and "[e]ach of you
must participate fully in the deliberations." (18RT 4470, 4491 [italics added].)"
(RB at pp. 218-219.) Respondent concedes that the court did not tell the jury that
it had to begin deliberations anew, but contends that this instruction was
"adequate." (RB at p. 219, Italics in RB.)
To the contrary, the instruction as quoted by respondent is devoid of the
most crucial element required by the proper instruction-- namely, a statement
directing the jury to start its deliberations anew in order to have the full and equal
13 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
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