Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

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Finally, she explained that while she was "strongly opposed" to the death penalty, she believed there are rare cases where a death sentence should be imposed for a deliberate murder. (23CT 6586.) She repeated this view when questioned by the trial court. (3RT 620.) Then, when asked if she would be able to impose the death penalty, she replied that she would be "hesitant." Thus, in these questions alone she indicated that she would be able to vote for the death penalty and would follow instructions. Many ofthe other responses she gave also indicate that this was a potential juror who did not favor the death penalty, but not only indicated that she would vote for it in some situation, but in other ways was likely to be a "prosecution biased" juror. Thus, the question in this case becomes whether Prospective Juror No. 2066 so indicated that she could not vote for the death penalty in any case. As respondent notes, there are many reasons to suspect that Prospective Juror No. 2066 would have been a sympathetic juror from the prosecution's perspective, as noted by respondent. For example, she stated that she was a "conservative" Republican who believed that the gun allegation could have affected her ability to be fair and impartial. (23CT 6567-6568.) Presumably, one could infer as a conservative, the gun allegation would make her more inclined to convict, if this were inclined to affect her ability to be fair. She also stated she would automatically distrust a member of a gang, and leaned towards believing that a gang member would automatically lie. (23CT 6578-6580.) This would make her inclined to disbelieve appellants and some ofthe witnesses who testified on their behalf. As a result, this is not a situation where it can be said that "the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'" (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.) The answers of Prospective Juror No. 2066's were similar to those of 128
prospective jurors who were found to have been wrongfully excused for cause in other cases. She expressed philosophical qualms about the death penalty, but she stated that she could return a verdict of death. This is indistinguishable from the juror in People v. Heard who likewise expressed anti-death penalty views on the juror questionnaire, but then reconsidered his views based on the trial court's explanation of the law. Furthermore, No. 2066 clearly stated that if she were ordered to consider aggravating factors, she would do so. This is the type ofjuror the state should want on a jury - willing to follow the law in spite of personal beliefs, able to change his or her mind to follow the instructions of the court, and honest enough to express views that may not be popular in the particular setting. While the prospective juror had responded to the questionnaire with answers that could indicate a bias against the death penalty, this is not a sufficient basis for a challenge for cause when she ultimately indicated a willingness and ability to impose the death penalty when allowed to expand upon her answers after hearing the court's explanation ofthe law. A jury panel is skewed in favor of death when all jurors who may have moral qualms about the death penalty, even when those jurors have indicated a willingness to follow the law, have been removed. This further impacts the reliability of the decision to impose the death penalty, in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, which impose greater reliability requirements in capital cases. (Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. 280, 305; Gilmore v. Taylor, supra, 508 U.S. 333, 334; Johnson v. Mississippi, supra, 486 U.S. 578, 584-585; Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. 862, 879.) As a result of the foregoing, it is apparent that the trial court erred in granting the prosecution's challenge for cause to Prospective Juror No. 2066 from the pool after a challenge by cause from the prosecution. 129
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TABLE OF CONTENTS APPELLANT WILLIAM
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2. The Pleadings Failed To NotifY A
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VI THE JURy FAILED TO FIND THE DEGR
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C. Standard OfReview And Prejudice
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XIII APPELLANT JOINS IN ALL ISSUES
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Mitchell v. Esparza (2003) 540 U.S.
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People v. Cruz (2001) 93 Cal.App.4t
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People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 2
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CALlIC No. 8.31 passim CALJIC No. 8
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ARGUMENTS GUILT PHASE ISSUES I THE
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the facts indicate that only one de
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form finding "personal use" to have
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57 Cal.AppAth 871, 877; 9 Witkin, C
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the weapon. Without again recountin
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Respondent notes that between the m
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In another apparent attempt to just
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appellant has repeatedly said, the
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not present them to the trial court
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In People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Ca
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Finally, it must be noted that the
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B. The Constitutional Issues Are No
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turn relied on the language from Wi
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Indeed, in this case the instructio
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as the prosecution's first-degree t
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F. Conclusion In summary, by failin
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As appellant explained in the openi
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in the manner suggested by responde
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Furthennore, it is well established
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Appellant has explained above and i
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Cal.App.3d 970, 992.) Instead, resp
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3. Appellant's Did Not Forfeit His
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In Argument V of the Opening Brief,
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IV IN FAILING TO REDACT PORTIONS OF
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People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
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have been unreasonable for the jury
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shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
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find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
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THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
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Robinson's wounds indicated the sho
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caused great bodily injury or death
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use enhancement, the statutory lang
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192-193), but fails to explain how
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Then we have the words "personal us
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trial and had therefore forfeited t
Page 91 and 92: merits of appellant's claim. (AOB a
Page 93 and 94: jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
Page 95 and 96: Respondent argues that another theo
Page 97 and 98: needs to rely on the penalty verdic
Page 99 and 100: may not cross-examine a witness upo
Page 101 and 102: itself to appellant would be improp
Page 103 and 104: B. The Court Erred In Refusing The
Page 105 and 106: egarding the intent ofthe non-shoot
Page 107 and 108: B. Respondent's Arguments Are Mispl
Page 109 and 110: ut is only being allowed for use ag
Page 111 and 112: x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTI
Page 113 and 114: XI THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN A
Page 115 and 116: "guarantee." Appellant is not proce
Page 117 and 118: v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
Page 119 and 120: Contreras. Viewed in this context,
Page 122 and 123: overwhelmingly showed that only one
Page 124 and 125: XII GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE VERDICT
Page 126 and 127: Where Juror No. 2211 is concerned,
Page 128 and 129: The jury in Cruz was given a versio
Page 130 and 131: PENALTY PHASE ISSUES XIV THE TRIAL
Page 132 and 133: B. The Flaw In Respondent's Content
Page 134 and 135: participation ofall jurors. Contrar
Page 136 and 137: confuse[d]" (Harris) is no more tha
Page 138: It is submitted that these instruct
Page 141: inherent power to review an issue i
Page 145 and 146: (Id at p. 821.) This court has char
Page 147 and 148: church. (18RT 4448:4-6,4451:11-14.)
Page 149 and 150: (18RT 4450:12-14) or her mother (18
Page 151 and 152: had in fact reached an impasse at t
Page 153 and 154: There is an impasse. It is hung. Bu
Page 155 and 156: establishes, for example, that, whe
Page 157 and 158: and Code of Civil Procedure 233, wh
Page 159 and 160: a demonstrable reality. The court a
Page 161 and 162: CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT Rule 8.63
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Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

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