Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

incredible. However, even if Vasquez's testimony were to be taken at face value,
the statements he quotes are ambiguous with respect to who was the actual
shooter. For example, the statements Vasquez attributed to appellant were that
"we did that" or "I did that" and that "I AK'd them" or "we AK'd them." (RB at
pp. 178-179, 6RT 1199-1200, 1203-1204, 1208-1211.) However, these quotes
reflect the fact that Vasquez did not know whether appellant was using the first
person singular, meaning that he personally shot the victims, or the plural, which
would mean that he was part of a group, one of whom fired the shots. If this
statement is interpreted to mean that he was not the actual shooter, a finding of
intent is not a necessary conclusion.
Secondly, as the prosecution's expert witness explained, and as the
prosecutor himself argued to the jury, in gang drive-by shooting there is a driver, a
shooter, and a lookout. (9RT 2104, 14RT 3211.) In such a situation, a gang
member describing the events may say, "We shot them," without regard to which
role he personally played in the shooting. Therefore, these statement do not
compel the conclusion that appellant was the shooter or that appellant had the
intent to kill. If the jury were to conclude from this evidence appellant was the
lookout, it could then have a doubt as to whether intent had been proven as to the
non-shooter.
Third, even assuming arguendo that the jury believed that appellant said "I
did that" or "I AK'd them"-- a fact of which even Vasquez himself was not
convinced and for which there was therefore at least a reasonable doubt as a matter
oflaw- there was evidence at trial, presented by the prosecution's expert witness,
that gang members often brag about their exploits to gain status. (9RT 1938.)
Therefore, even if the jury could have believed that appellant made the statement,
it did not necessarily have to accept appellant's alleged braggadocio as the truth.
Indeed, in claiming that appellant was personally confessing to being the
actual shooter, respondent notes that in the same statement where appellant
confessed to being the shooter, appellant claimed to be alone in the car when he
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