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Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

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may not cross-examine a witness upon collateral matters for the purpose <strong>of</strong> eliciting<br />

something to be contradicted. [Citations] This is especially so where the matter the<br />

party seeks to elicit would be inadmissible were it not for the fortuitous circumstance<br />

that the witness lied in response to the party's questions." (People v. Lavergne<br />

(1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 744.)<br />

This is precisely what occurred in this case. Kelly was called by the defense<br />

to present testimony as to several facts, including: the fact that appellant personally<br />

had no racist tendencies; the fact that all the gang members had access to the rifle<br />

used in the murders; and the fact that prosecution witness Joshua Contreras was<br />

frequently under the influence <strong>of</strong> methamphetamine. (See AOB at p. 155.) On<br />

cross-examination, the prosecution asked Kelly if he had <strong>of</strong>fered someone money<br />

to testify that the West Side Wilmas get along with African-Americans. Kelly<br />

denied that he had done so. (lORT 2413.) Thereafter, the prosecution called Glen<br />

Phillips to testify that he heard Kelly <strong>of</strong>fer Warren Battle, a African-American<br />

employee <strong>of</strong> Phillips, $100 to testify that ''we'' get along with African-Americans.<br />

(13RT 2978-2979.)<br />

Obviously, the only reason why the prosecutor originally asked Kelly about<br />

this attempt to purchase testimony was to get in the testimony <strong>of</strong> Phillips after<br />

Kelly denied the fact. Equally obvious is the fact that had Kelly not denied this<br />

fact, Phillips' testimony on this point would not have been admissible on its own;<br />

it became admissible solely because <strong>of</strong> Kelly's denial. Because Kelly's <strong>of</strong>fer to<br />

Phillips was not an issue in this case, it is a classic collateral issue. Therefore, this is<br />

exactly within the rule explained in People v. Lavergne.<br />

Respondent also dismisses the likelihood <strong>of</strong> potential confusion caused by<br />

this evidence in a conclusory manner. (RB at p. 127.) However, as explained in<br />

<strong>Appellant</strong>'s Opening <strong>Brief</strong> (AOB at pp. 161-162), there actually was demonstrable<br />

confusion when the prosecutor misstated the purpose for which this evidence was<br />

<strong>of</strong>fered, arguing that it was <strong>of</strong>fered to prove Kelly tried to bribe Warren Battle to<br />

testify falsely, when, in fact, the evidence was originally <strong>of</strong>fered not for the truth <strong>of</strong><br />

85

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