Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
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appellants guilty <strong>of</strong> willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (l5RT 3457<br />
3458; 38CT 10925-10940), the jury clearly knew that it was making a specific<br />
'first degree' finding." (RB at p. 94.)<br />
This is a conclusory statement that is not supported by either law or logic.<br />
The jury is not skilled in law, and there is no reason why a lay jury would<br />
understand the consequences <strong>of</strong> making a particular finding <strong>of</strong> fact. In any event,<br />
the statute calls for the jury to fmd the degree <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fense. It does not call on<br />
the jury to recite the facts. (Pen. Code, § 1157.)<br />
"It is a cardinal rule that a court is not justified in ignoring the plain words <strong>of</strong><br />
a statute unless it clearly appears that the language used is contrary to what, beyond<br />
question, was the intent <strong>of</strong> the Legislature." (Cisneros v. Vueve (1995) 37<br />
Cal.AppAth 906, 910, citations omitted.)<br />
Taking a somewhat different tack, respondent argues that the jury received<br />
instructions on drive-by murder, which is a form <strong>of</strong> first degree murder. (RB at p.<br />
94.) The problem with this contention is that this was a theory <strong>of</strong> liability for first<br />
degree murder, but the jury did not make any finding as to whether this was the<br />
theory it was adopting in reaching its verdict. Therefore, it cannot be said whether<br />
or not the jury found first degree murder based on this fact.<br />
In fact, even respondent apparently does not believe it is a foregone<br />
conclusion that the jury concluded that this murder arose from a drive-by shooting.<br />
In another argument, respondent claimed "....the jury could find that appellants<br />
had enough time to fire the murder weapon from outside their car..." (RB at p.<br />
118, italics added.) Because section 189 makes it first degree murder ifthe killing<br />
is committed "by means <strong>of</strong> discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle" if the<br />
shooter was outside the car, as respondent suggests was possible, it would not<br />
necessarily be first degree murder by reason <strong>of</strong> this theory. Therefore, while this<br />
is a theory that the jury could have adopted, there is no indication in the form <strong>of</strong> a<br />
specific finding that it was in fact adopted, and the facts giving rise to that theory<br />
were not necessarily conclusively established.<br />
80