The South Africa – Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus (PDF ... - WWF

situation at the source: south africa
LegAL commeRciAL tRAde in Rhino hoRn
White Rhino drinking.
TIM jACkSON/AFRICA GEOGRAPHIC
Some of the major private and State rhino stakeholders in South Africa are actively campaigning for the
legalization of trade in rhino horn, believing that a legal supply of horn could be part of the solution to
the current poaching crisis and contribute to continued expansion of rhino range and numbers. The South
African government has received a number of proposals for legalizing trade, including one from the provincial
authority Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, although all remain under consideration and none have been
endorsed. Other observers are profoundly opposed to this approach for a range of ethical, moral, economic
and practical reasons. There is no denying that the debate around legal trade in horn is an incredibly “hot
topic” in South Africa and one that has become increasingly polarized, with few objective considerations
of the costs and benefits of market approaches under different trade regimes and timeframes. However, at a
recent national rhino dialogue meeting, a number of speakers called for a balanced evaluation of the pros
and cons of all possible options in order to best identify the courses of action that will most likely support
the realization of many fundamental rhino conservation objectives in South Africa.
Overall, there seems to be some lack of understanding for the CITES process, which remains the international
mechanism under which any proposed trade solution linking South Africa with a rhino hornconsuming
country will unfold. As a multi-lateral treaty with 175 Party States, CITES works by subjecting
international trade in specimens of listed species to certain controls which mandate that all import,
export and re-export of species covered by the Convention be authorized through a permitting system.
If South Africa ever wishes to conduct a legal trade in rhino horn, the country will need to submit a
proposal to CITES and gain a two-thirds majority vote in its favour. CITES is not overtly prescriptive
concerning the specific requirements that will necessarily underpin a competent trading regime but,
based on precedent established for trade in other highly contentious wildlife commodities, such as elephant
ivory, a range of issues will most likely need to be addressed, including: the identification of
trading partners and stakeholders participating in the system; the structure and trading protocols to be
used in both source and consuming countries; the marking or identification system to differentiate
legal horn and horn products from illegal stocks; the control measures to prevent horns and products
of illegal origin from leaking into legal trade channels; other law enforcement and regulatory procedures
to ensure compliance with reporting and stock inventory obligations; the use of the revenues
that will be generated through trade; and the delineation of public awareness initiatives to disseminate
information and foster understanding for the system.
Moreover, and as was the case for the two one-off sales of elephant ivory under CITES, the Parties may
also choose to activate a “panel of experts” or some other oversight body to vet the proposal, determine
the acceptability of trading partners or audit implementation. A mechanism, possibly under the direction
of the CITES Standing Committee, to stop the trade if failure to comply with agreed conditions occurs or
unintended consequences result must be developed. And finally, the views of other rhino range States
will need to be solicited and addressed through some kind of meaningful process, with a view to minimizing
any potential negative impacts that might arise as a result of South Africa’s actions.
In any event, a legal rhino horn trade proposal moving into the CITES arena should holistically address
the broadest range of concerns and the South African representatives to CITES should be fully prepared
to address with thoughtful and confident answers the plethora of queries and concerns that will inevitably
come forward. At the time of publication of this report, it seems unlikely, though not completely
impossible, that the South African government will submit a proposal requesting legal trade in rhino
horn to CITES CoP16 to be held in March 2013. As these meetings are held every three years, the next
opportunity for the submission of a proposal would be CoP17 in March 2016, unless an intersessional
postal process were followed.
What follows is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of this issue nor an attempt to make a decision
either way regarding legal commercial trade in rhino horn. Indeed, it seems premature to do so, when so
many key issues and details concerning how any such trade would be structured and implemented
remain unknown. It would be remiss, however, to describe the current situation in rhino conservation in
South Africa without considering this important debate. Thus, a brief overview of the current scenario in
terms of pros, cons and practical considerations is appropriate.
Arguments given in support of legal trade in rhino horn
Proponents of legal trade in rhino horn accept that demand for rhino horn clearly exists in Asia and
believe that meeting this demand with some form of legal supply may be far more effective than
attempting to enforce a continued prohibition on the trade. They point to indications that demand for
horn may be price inelastic and, therefore, argue that approaches that rely exclusively upon law
enforcement may be doomed to failure because they simply create opportunities for organized criminals
to make “big money”. In their view, this belief is buttressed by tangible evidence concerning what
happened with the prohibition of alcohol in the U.S. during the 1920s or what is going on right now
with respect to the so-called “war on drugs”. One of the fundamental arguments provided by resource
economists in support of legal trade in rhino horn is the theory that the provision of an increased legal
supply of rhino horn would reduce black market prices and, thus, the financial gains profiteers are currently
making from illegal trade. This, in turn, it is reasoned, will lead to a reduction in illegal demand
and, ultimately, rhino poaching (Eustace, 2012; ’t Sas-Rolfes, 2012). In addition, proponents of legal
trade additionally offer that the required rhino horn could be supplied from rhinos that did not have
to be killed for this purpose, such as stockpiles of horn from natural mortalities or legal dehorning
activities. The hope is that rhino horn could be provided on a sustainable basis without killing animals
as horn regrowth occurs at the rate of about 3.5–6 cm each year, depending on the age of the animal
(Pienaar et al., 1991). Proponents do not expect poaching to stop completely, but hope that legal supplies
would meet some of the demand that would otherwise have to be fulfilled by killing rhinos.
In theory, income generated by selling rhino horn could also provide much-needed revenue to help
rhino owners and managers enhance rhino protection and intelligence-gathering activities to improve
security for rhino populations on both State and private land. Shifting the cost-benefit equation away
from poachers and crime syndicates currently profiting from illegal trade to those promoting rhino conservation
values is a laudable goal. In general, increased security costs for rhinos in South Africa are not
being augmented by international funding sources, but rather are being shouldered by the rhino owners
and custodians themselves. Further, some argue that income from horn sales could be used to support in
situ rhino conservation more broadly across both Africa and Asia, but private sector stakeholder buy-in
for such a notion may actually be rather limited. Legal sales of horn could increase positive incentives for
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