The South Africa – Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus (PDF ... - WWF

situation at the source: south africa
rhino ownership by both private and State stakeholders, which could support the ongoing growth in
rhino numbers and range in South Africa. Some hold the view that recent indications of declining live
rhino sale prices and an increasing number of private owners divesting themselves of rhinos may continue
without legalization of horn trade, thus reducing the land available for rhinos and negatively impacting
upon rhino numbers in the long term. Whilst this is not yet an established trend, a reduction in
potential rhino range, as well as financial resources available to support rhino conservation, have been
identified as conservation challenges that exist above and beyond the current poaching crisis. Some proponents
also argue that if legalizing the trade is found to not work, producing unacceptable consequences
and outcomes, they would be accepting of interventions to shut the trade down completely.
It should be recognized that many proponents of legal trade are deeply concerned about the future of
South Africa’s rhinos and believe, as a matter of urgency, that trade may prove a compelling solution to
the present crisis. At the same time, however, there is no unified viewpoint amongst legal trade proponents
concerning the higher-level objectives of a legal trade, and there is a clear gap between those
who are motivated to use trade to curtail rhino poaching and those wishing to use trade to generate
maximum revenue.
In fact, the salient features of how a legal trade would be structured and which countries or markets
would be part of the trade remain completely vague and any discussion of the issue is bedevilled by the
fact that the “devil is in the detail”. For example, those in favour of legal trade argue that DNA analyses
could be used to distinguish between legal and illegal horn at different stages in the market, but no
details of exactly how this would be mechanistically undertaken, who would pay for it or how it would
be enforced, have been set out to date. Another example concerns the range of different market mechanisms
that have been proposed to manage a legal trade, but there is no consensus on how prices should
be set or the best process for controlling the market. Some propose adopting a central selling organization
approach like DeBeers did with its diamond cartel, others have mentioned an auction-type scenario
that would allow rhino horn to sell at market values, whilst still others have advocated a central registration
in South Africa for legally-obtained horns, which would be shipped to the government of the
agreed trading partner; that government would then decide who could purchase the horns locally.
Similarly, there is the issue of rhino horn that could potentially supply the trade coming from a number
of different sources within both the State and private sectors. Whilst existing rhino horn stockpiles,
ongoing natural mortalities or active dehorning operations could all supply horn, it is not always exactly
clear which sources are being referred to in discussions around legal trade in rhino horn. Limited
work has also been done in quantifying how much horn could be made available from South Africa
from different sources under different trade scenarios, but this could have a significant impact on the
efficacy of using a legal supply to mitigate poaching impacts. These kinds of unresolved issues serve to
confound the discussion.
Arguments given against legal trade in rhino horn
Opponents of legal trade in rhino horn also accept that a recharged demand for rhino horn currently
exists in Asia, but remain opposed to legal trade at the present time for a variety of reasons. Like those
on the other side of the fence, a diversity of opinions is found, ranging from dogmatic or philosophical
opposition on principle to more pragmatic considerations of timing or other detail. On one side of the
spectrum are those commentators who believe that any form of trade or sustainable utilization of wildlife
is inherently wrong and should never be countenanced. However, such views are contrary to the
sustainable-use philosophies that form the cornerstone of conservation approaches adopted by the
majority of African rhino range States and many other conservation bodies. Indeed, the practical application
of sustainable-use principles has been one of the reasons for South Africa’s White Rhino conservation
success story, the current poaching crisis notwithstanding.
It is an established fact that demand for rhino horn has been dramatically reduced in many former
major markets in the past and some observers believe that this may be possible to achieve again in new
markets such as Viet Nam. For example, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Yemen all were once major
consumers of rhino horn, but no longer feature in the present rhino horn trade in a significant way.
Even mainland China falls into this category to some extent as entire avenues of trade, for example the
use of rhino horn in manufactured traditional medicines, is no longer occurring. It is further argued
that awareness campaigns, coupled with unequivocal expressions of political will and government
actions to curtail illegal trade, may have the potential to significantly reduce current rhino horn usage,
particularly in the non-traditional market that Viet Nam represents. The effectiveness of such efforts,
however, could be compromised by legalizing the supply of rhino horn, some argue.
A key issue to consider is the fact that all of the former rhino horn-consuming countries/territories in
Asia, and also Viet Nam, have effected legal bans against the trade and most have moved to completely
remove rhino horn as an approved ingredient in their traditional medicine pharmacopoeias. Any proposal
to CITES to allow legal trade in rhino horn would require the identification of a trading partner
in the form of a consumer interested in opening a legal rhino horn market, but there has been no clear
indication of interest from any of the known end-user countries/territories in Asia to date.
Furthermore, as domestic sales of rhino horn are illegal in virtually all consumer countries/territories
that might be a trading partner, any move to lift internal trade bans would require necessary changes
to national legislation to permit legal trade. And finally, if Viet Nam is targeted as the trading partner
owing to the role it currently plays as the world’s primary rhino horn consumer, many remain wary
whether the country would be able to implement a structured legal trade regime and adequately police
the internal market against illegal trade. The reasons for this are detailed in the Vietnamese section of
this report, which addresses the current situation within that end-user market.
Another related concern is that a legal rhino horn supply could be seen to legitimize or encourage rhino
horn use which might actually increase demand at different scales or encourage speculation, especially if
legal horn is suddenly available at reduced prices. Because current levels of demand and consumption in
Viet Nam and elsewhere are unknown (including the appearance of emerging illegal rhino horn utilization
in China), demand expansion in the wake of a legal avenue of trade could potentially exacerbate the plethora
of problems associated with the present illegal horn trade. Instead of decreasing demand for rhino horn,
if increasing supply of legal horn at reduced prices actually stimulates a far greater number of consumers to
purchase horn, and this leads to a rising demand that is difficult to supply with legal sources of horn, the
activation of legal trade would be self-defeating in terms of reducing poaching pressure on rhinos. Some
have also expressed moral concerns that providing a legal supply of rhino horn would tacitly legitimize current
non-traditional uses, for example the treatment of fatal illnesses such as cancer, and that this is ethically
wrong in the absence of clinical trials and scientific evidence attesting to the efficacy of such remedies.
A paramount concern of many observers is the possibility of laundering illegal horns from poached rhinos
into a legal market. Such a development could equally impact on other rhino range States in Africa
and Asia, as well as South Africa. There are many instances of wildlife commodity trade where legal and
illegal trades have existed in parallel, and export, wholesale or retail dealers have had access to both
sources of trade. In some cases, legal commerce has been undermined by the illegal trade over time,
including the caviar trade from Central Asia (Vaisman and Fomenko, 2006; de Meulenaer and
Raymakers, 1996), African Grey Parrots from Central Africa (Mulliken, 1995), the abalone trade from
South Africa (Plagányi et al., 2011; Raemaekers et al., 2011), the snake skin trade from Indonesia
(Nijman and Shepherd, 2009), and most recently the ivory trade in China (Martin and Vigne, 2011).
Issues of price, availability and quality are important considerations in the legal vs illegal trade equation.
The fact that rhino horn will most likely change form into a generic, nondescript powder in the
end-use market presents a further challenging dimension for the development of an effective identification,
monitoring and law enforcement system that precludes laundering of illicit horn into the trade.
Given the challenges and the complexity that any workable system would necessarily entail, some
question remains as to whether the kind of political will and oversight capabilities of potential user
countries are sufficient to monitor and police such a trade effectively. For example, to date, Viet Nam
seems unwilling or unable to control and monitor its hunting trophy imports, or to police its internal
markets in spite of legal prohibitions making commercial trade in rhino horn illegal.
Within South Africa, a similar host of issues remain unresolved. Some have argued that unresolved issues
vis-à-vis provincial permitting practices, the failure to implement TOPS regulations in all provinces, ongoing
rhino horn stock registration problems and other lapses in government regulation and oversight do
not bode well for the implementation of a legal trade regime in the country. South Africa needs to demonstrate
a functional and integrated national permitting and information management system for rhinos.
Others draw attention to the failure of many private sector stakeholders to provide information on
numbers of rhinos on their properties and horn stockpiles in their possession. Some conservationists also
have concerns that opening a legal trade supply may encourage farmers to selectively breed White Rhinos
specifically for their horns, resulting in semi-domestication, giving rise to potential animal welfare issues
and resulting in a genetic skew within farmed rhino populations.
As the full range of specifics for the practical arrangements necessary for implementation of a successful
legal trade regime remain unclear at best, it remains difficult to thoughtfully examine the legal rhino
horn trade issue until it moves beyond the realm of unresolved priorities and experimental theories.
104 the south africa – viet nam rhino horn trade nexus TRAFFIC 105