Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara Third ... - Scarecrow Press

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INTRODUCTION • lix network (which now encompassed about three-fifths of the entire territory) and inflicted additional civilian casualties and property damage, some of it against buildings which MINURSO itself had planned to utilize. Moreover, on and after September 6—when the formal cease-fire went into effect—MINURSO was given only limited cooperation by Morocco (and after a time by the Polisario Front as well, as the front perceived its own cooperation was not being reciprocated), and its 300 or so blue-helmeted peacekeeping troops were unable to do much more than monitor the military forces of both sides and try to survive in the nearly unbearable desert heat. When the civilian staff of MINURSO got down to ascertaining voter eligibility, the situation became even worse, as Morocco and Polisario held—and would continue to hold over the next decade and beyond—radically differing approaches to determining which Saharawis were entitled to cast ballots. In particular, the types of documents to be used by MINURSO in its work proved controversial, as did the mission’s plans to use the oral recollections of tribal elders from both Polisario-controlled and Moroccan-administered areas. Both Rabat and the Saharawi nationalists obviously believed that these elders were susceptible to undue outside influences. A long diplomatic drama thus began, with the end of the first act coming on December 19, 1991, when outgoing Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar submitted a progress report to the UN Security Council. Recounting the problems attending MINURSO and the slow progress it was making toward holding a referendum, he also proposed to institute new voter eligibility criteria. Essentially, this plan would open the voter rolls to any Saharawi who could establish that he or she had resided continuously in Western Sahara for six years continuously or 12 years intermittently prior to 1974 (the date of the last Spanish census); contrary to what Morocco wanted, this opportunity would be given to one generation of Western Saharans only. Polisario reacted furiously, calling into question Pérez de Cuéllar’s impartiality (and indeed, the UN leader’s own memoirs published several years later revealed a marked pro-Moroccan bias) and stating that Morocco’s alleged “importation” of either Moroccans or Saharawis from Morocco proper prior to the arrival of MINURSO would fatally tilt the outcome of any plebiscite conducted under the new proposal. Acting on December 31, just before Pérez de Cuéllar left office to be succeeded by Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt, the Security Council basically sided with Polisario (and its
lx • INTRODUCTION sponsor, Algeria), refusing to ratify the new proposals and instead urging the incoming UN leadership to take a fresh look at the Western Sahara conflict. The departure, apparently out of frustration, of UN Special Representative Johannes Manz at the end of 1991 also added to the overall atmosphere of gloom. Under Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, the UN made little more progress toward its goal, although some voter-registration activity resumed after Polisario, during 1994, retreated from its earlier categorical rejection of Pérez de Cuéllar’s December 1991 criteria as a gesture of good faith and also to show flexibility. Impediments kept cropping up, though, as previous objections made by the parties over the reliability of documents and oral recollections by tribal elders made the process extremely slow-moving. In addition, the Polisario Front suspended its participation in the peace process after anti-Moroccan demonstrations in El-Ayoun and elsewhere were repressed by the Rabat authorities despite the presence on the ground of MINURSO peacekeeping soldiers and UN civil police. Although this period of non-cooperation soon ended, during 1995 and 1996 Boutros-Ghali was often reduced to issuing threats that the whole MINURSO endeavor might be abandoned, something that would probably have led to the resumption of armed conflict, as Polisario had repeatedly warned. But the Security Council, mindful that the preservation of the cease-fire was MINURSO’s one substantial and lasting contribution to date, never seriously considered terminating the mission’s mandate, and kept on granting extensions even as the costs incurred by the UN rose to an estimated $1.3 billion by March 2005. The departure of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as UN secretary-general in late 1996 and his replacement by Kofi Annan of Ghana opened up new possibilities for a settlement in a rather unexpected way. In March 1997, Annan requested that former U.S. secretary of state James A. Baker III serve as the secretary-general’s special personal envoy to Western Sahara and attempt to move the referendum process forward. Setting to work, Baker held many meetings with Moroccan and Polisario officials in several world capitals as well as in his home city of Houston, Texas, eventually producing (in September 1997) the socalled Houston Accords, which provided for the resumption of voterenrollment activity (particularly with respect to four hotly contested Saharawi tribal groupings) and the adherence by both sides to a new Code
Page 1 and 2: Historical Dictionary of Western Sa
Page 3 and 4: Editor’s Foreword While nearly al
Page 5 and 6: Preface As was the case in the seco
Page 7 and 8: Reader’s Notes The Western Sahara
Page 9 and 10: Acronyms and Abbreviations AMD Alli
Page 11 and 12: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • xix
Page 13 and 14: Chronology c. 5000 BC Beginning of
Page 15 and 16: 1578-1603 Moroccan Sultan Ahmed el-
Page 17 and 18: continues his resistance until 1919
Page 19 and 20: er 20: UN General Assembly calls fo
Page 21 and 22: CHRONOLOGY • xxxi Morocco, Maurit
Page 23 and 24: CHRONOLOGY • xxxiii down several
Page 25 and 26: CHRONOLOGY • xxxv Council unanimo
Page 27 and 28: CHRONOLOGY • xxxvii period.” No
Page 29 and 30: CHRONOLOGY • xxxix they would sup
Page 31 and 32: CHRONOLOGY • xli could be disband
Page 33 and 34: xliv • INTRODUCTION 1960s and ext
Page 35 and 36: xlvi • INTRODUCTION Ibn Tashfin,
Page 37 and 38: xlviii • INTRODUCTION the 19th ce
Page 39 and 40: l • INTRODUCTION was afflicted by
Page 41 and 42: lii • INTRODUCTION (ICJ) for a de
Page 43 and 44: liv • INTRODUCTION bringing the c
Page 45 and 46: lvi • INTRODUCTION decide its fut
Page 47: lviii • INTRODUCTION the characte
Page 51 and 52: lxii • INTRODUCTION made no menti
Page 53 and 54: lxiv • INTRODUCTION THE FUTURE By

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