Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara Third ... - Scarecrow Press

lxiv • INTRODUCTION
THE FUTURE
By early 2006, the situation in Western Sahara looked decidedly unpromising.
With the UN Identification Commission out of business and
its files transported to safe storage in Geneva, MINURSO’s only function
was to supervise the so-far intact cease-fire and to carry out a series
of “confidence-building” measures in the territory, including reciprocal
visits by Saharawi family members on both sides of the
Morocco-Polisario divide who had not seen each other since the outbreak
of the Saharan war in 1975.
In addition, the diplomacy surrounding the territory was moving at an
even more glacial pace in the first half of 2004, due not only to the
many competing demands on the time and resources of the UN but also
to the continued reluctance of France and the United States to put any
real political pressure on Morocco to induce it to allow self-determination;
both countries had long seen Morocco as a key Arab and African
ally, either for historical reasons (as with Paris) or for either Cold War
or anti-Islamic fundamentalist strategic reasons. But there were a few
small signs that Morocco’s star was dimming.
The new régime of King Mohamed VI had not proven itself the
diplomatic equal of Hassan II’s government. Having allowed itself to be
outfoxed by Algeria and the Polisario Front over the second peace plan
authored by James Baker, Rabat seemed blind to the possibility that accepting
the plan might allow it to soften its heavy-handed reputation on
the Western Sahara problem. Moreover, it was joined in its intransigence
most enthusiastically by French President Jacques Chirac, who
pointedly called Western Sahara “the southern provinces of Morocco”
during a 2001 state visit to Morocco. But France’s backing could not
provide much comfort for King Mohamed, as Paris was in disfavor with
the American administration led by President George W. Bush owing to
its opposition to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Morocco also
rashly induced a military confrontation in July 2002 with Spanish Prime
Minister José María Aznar when it occupied the contested islet of Perejil
in the Mediterranean, obliging Aznar (who had previously been lukewarm
toward Morocco on other issues), to forcibly, albeit bloodlessly,
eject Moroccan forces from the uninhabited territory several days later.
Aznar’s government, to make things somewhat worse for King Mohamed,
was closely aligned with the Bush administration over Iraq and