manual for commanders of infantry platoons. - US Army Combined ...

192 M'ANU~AL iFOR CONIMMANDERS. OF INFACENTRYL PLATOO~NS.;
F~inally, the 37 gunl is well a~dapted to masked fire; it canl regis­
.ter on impportannt approaches, trench crossings, etc. But th"re
range should be checked at. each shot, for, althlough it is a very
accurate weapon,· its range will change copsi~era~bly during th.e
couise of one continuous firing if thle atmnosph~eric condi~tions
change.
CEIHAPTER~hVTI.
PRIN9~CIPLES OF FIE~LD FOR88T~IfiCATIION.
The purpose of the usxe of field fortiif~ication by troops engaged
in battle is to lessen the deadly action of hostile fire and also to
affo~rd 'the mneans of holding a position strongly with Wiseakforces.
The second m~ission is fulfilled by arranging the trenches so as to
take advantage of the mnachine guns. mlachine rifles, grenades,
and trench weapons wvith which, the infantry is now armnedl.
In. battle thle numb~ers en~raged are so great, andl the effects
produced or su *ered are so tremendlou~s, that conztinuzouts lines of
trenches occupiedl by conztinuzouls lines of comlbatants are necessary.
These lines succeed each other or are constlructed successively
in the direction of depth in suffcien~t numzber to shelter
the firing line, the supports, and the reserves during the mlost
important halts in their general movemuent to the fro~nt. They
are joined together by a system of commuinticatons which miust
be as comlplete aCspossib3le. The continuous line includes strong2·
(poinzts. But these must he concealed in a nletxvorkl of trenches,
zigzags, and dummy trenches. Isolated strong points sp~ottedl
by photography (hostile aeroplane) become traps under hlostile
bomnbardm-ent. Mioreover, breaks in the contin~uity of the line
of trenches permit the enemy to drive wFedages into our lines.
The continuous tr'ench also tak~es away fromn thne defenders that
feeling: of isolation they would feel if in a wor'k scepara'ted fromm
the general line.
Af-ter the battle, on the contrary, upon a front being consolidated,,
the probleml is one of very effectivel~y occupying the t~errain
andl doing it; with a mnuch smlaller number of men t~han
duringazcltive combat. This is the general case; it is no longer per1­