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Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Security Sector

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Assuring integrity<br />

<strong>Control</strong> during Budget Preparation<br />

<strong>Military</strong> budgeting is based on a rigorous <strong>and</strong> reliable forecasting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budget/fiscal constraints<br />

in a comprehensive <strong>and</strong> consistent quantitative macroeconomic framework. All underlying assumptions<br />

for budget planning, i.e., major fiscal risks, uncertain costs, specific expenditure<br />

commitments, etc., are clearly documented <strong>and</strong> properly accounted for. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, major<br />

underlying assumptions such as macroeconomic forecasts, fiscal forecasts, etc. are assessed<br />

by independent experts.<br />

All defense programs are assessed using a comprehensive <strong>and</strong> consistent set <strong>of</strong> cost factors<br />

that are clearly related to <strong>the</strong> findings <strong>of</strong> an independent national statistics agency. Integrity<br />

checks, as well as programming <strong>and</strong> budgeting, are systematically supported by an information<br />

system with tools for automated analysis <strong>and</strong> decision support. The accounting basis is clearly<br />

indicated, with full statement indicating any changes in practices as well as current accounting<br />

policy. Alternative programs <strong>and</strong> budgets, corresponding to different assumptions, are clearly<br />

identified <strong>and</strong> documented. There is a clear written procedure to transition from one alternative<br />

to ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>and</strong> transition points are also clearly documented. History <strong>of</strong> both plans <strong>and</strong> implementation<br />

results <strong>and</strong> assessments is readily available.<br />

Chapter 23<br />

Parliament <strong>and</strong> <strong>Civil</strong> Society during Budget Preparation <strong>and</strong><br />

Approval<br />

Parliamentarian <strong>and</strong> societal control over <strong>the</strong> budgeting cycle <strong>of</strong>ten meets a long-established<br />

culture <strong>of</strong> supremacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> executive in <strong>the</strong> security sector. 1 None<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> “power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

purse” can <strong>and</strong> should be exercised to ensure accountability in <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public resources<br />

for security <strong>and</strong> defense.<br />

The most important role <strong>of</strong> Parliament is in setting proper legislative framework that guarantees—to<br />

<strong>the</strong> extent feasible within <strong>the</strong> particular constitutional framework—implementation <strong>of</strong><br />

all principles, listed in <strong>the</strong> previous chapter, adding as well legislation for a comprehensive audit<br />

<strong>and</strong> review process. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, parliamentarian <strong>and</strong> societal oversight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> security sector<br />

through <strong>the</strong> budget should be solidly rooted in <strong>the</strong> political culture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country.<br />

Among all requirements, critically important are (1) <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Parliament <strong>and</strong> interested<br />

non-governmental organizations to assess <strong>the</strong> product <strong>the</strong> security sector will provide<br />

given certain budget allocations <strong>and</strong> (2) <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> sufficient information to make such<br />

assessments during budget preparation <strong>and</strong> approval, overseeing <strong>the</strong> execution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budget<br />

<strong>and</strong> reviewing budget accounts.<br />

Budgeting for results<br />

Technically, more difficult is to assess what kind <strong>of</strong> ‘product’ security sector organizations plan<br />

to provide with <strong>the</strong> budget <strong>the</strong>y request <strong>and</strong> how that product relates to declared security <strong>and</strong><br />

1 Hans Born, ed., Parliamentarian Oversight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Sector</strong>, p. 129.<br />

93

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