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Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Security Sector

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112<br />

Recruitment<br />

The People in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Sector</strong><br />

All personnel management policies, including recruitment policy, are subject to democratic control.<br />

Parliaments should seek guarantees that <strong>the</strong> recruitment system for <strong>the</strong> security services is<br />

open to all segments <strong>of</strong> society <strong>and</strong> selection is based on merit <strong>and</strong> quality. All positions within<br />

<strong>the</strong> security services must be open to all citizens, regardless <strong>of</strong> gender, political affiliation, class,<br />

race or religion. 2 Ideally, <strong>the</strong> personnel composition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> security services, police <strong>and</strong> armed<br />

forces in particular, mirror <strong>the</strong> society. A number <strong>of</strong> democratic countries implement specific<br />

policies to encourage under-represented societal groups to apply for positions in <strong>the</strong> security<br />

services.<br />

In states, where <strong>the</strong> constitutional duty “to defend <strong>the</strong> country” is made compulsory through<br />

law for military service, parliaments should establish clear rules for liability, duration <strong>of</strong> service,<br />

postponement <strong>and</strong> exemption, penalties for evasion, age limits, <strong>and</strong> recruitment procedures. In<br />

conscript armies, to some extent in a fully pr<strong>of</strong>essional as well, i.e., voluntary, military, <strong>the</strong> service<br />

may perform important social functions providing education, skills <strong>and</strong> qualification that may<br />

be <strong>of</strong> use after <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> service <strong>and</strong>, most importantly, to function as a ‘melting pot’ <strong>of</strong><br />

various groups <strong>of</strong> society.<br />

Most democratic countries, that still keep <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> conscription, recognize by law <strong>the</strong><br />

right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> individual to refuse to join <strong>the</strong> armed forces <strong>and</strong> bear arms based on <strong>the</strong>ir religion or<br />

personal conviction. Such ‘conscientious objectors’ must carry out a national service as alternative<br />

to <strong>the</strong> military service. The regulations on recognizing <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> ‘conscientious objector’<br />

<strong>and</strong> carrying out alternative service, as well as <strong>the</strong>ir implementation, are subject to parliamentarian<br />

control <strong>and</strong> oversight.<br />

An effective <strong>and</strong> competitive recruitment system allows discretion on employment <strong>and</strong> payment<br />

<strong>of</strong> security service personnel. Remuneration is an important factor in finding suitable c<strong>and</strong>idates<br />

for <strong>the</strong> security sector organizations. And yet, a clear primacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupational as<br />

opposed to institutional motivations in choosing a career in a security service potentially leads to<br />

structural defects in <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>ession <strong>and</strong> limits strongly <strong>the</strong> possibilities for objective civilian<br />

control. 3<br />

Education<br />

The education <strong>of</strong> security service personnel should promote key democratic values <strong>and</strong> norms,<br />

while creating pr<strong>of</strong>essionals who are dedicated <strong>and</strong> prepared for <strong>the</strong>ir tasks. To that effect it<br />

would include courses on democracy, constitutional, international <strong>and</strong> humanitarian law. The<br />

education needs to be politically neutral – it should not include in any way political ideology <strong>and</strong><br />

elements <strong>of</strong> propag<strong>and</strong>a. 4<br />

In addition to <strong>the</strong> necessary technical expertise, security personnel—<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficer corps in<br />

particular—should be prepared to deal with <strong>the</strong> ambiguity <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> unpredictability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 21st<br />

2 Ibid., p. 152.<br />

3 As defined by Samuel P. Huntington in The Soldier <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> State: The Theory <strong>and</strong> Politics <strong>of</strong> <strong>Civil</strong>-<br />

<strong>Military</strong> <strong>Relations</strong>, renewed edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985).<br />

4 Hans Born, ed., Parliamentarian Oversight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Sector</strong>, p. 152.

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