Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Security Sector

10
Conceptual Developments in the Security Sector
(counterintelligence) and the National Guard Service (which provides protection to VIP personalities
and strategic infrastructure such as nuclear power plant, ministries, etc.) are under the
direct control of the President. And since the President himself is not under the control of the
Parliament, his subordinates are also beyond this control. In view of the fact that the President
has no right to take legislative initiatives, these organizations still have no legal framework of
their own.
President – Government. Most of the President's activities are based on governmental proposals,
but his own opinion on the issues can in one way or another influence the political process.
The problem lies in the fact that the President has no apparatus to support him in making
decisions. His administration includes several security sector secretaries - for foreign affairs,
security and defense. Bulgaria's experience shows that in most cases problems emerge when
the President and the Government represent different political powers. In such a case presidents
have several times refused to sign decrees for promotion of generals, have generated
alternative foreign policy priorities and even have voiced contradictory statements in regard to
the reform and development of the armed forces.
Beyond this, another problem is the issue concerning the command and control authority in
peacetime, in emergency, crisis and in wartime. According to the Constitution, the President is
the Commander-in-Chief both in peacetime and wartime. But nowadays in-between peace and
war there is a period of crisis, which might turn out to be long-term rather than flash. The current
constitutional and legal structure does not provide an answer to such a complex issue as the
transfer of power from one center of political power to another, like for example this is clearly
outlined in the two different models of political system of Germany and the US.
Parliament – Government. In Bulgaria the Cabinet is endorsed by the Parliament, but ministers
are not required to be Members of Parliament (MPs). This is reflected on the quality of
management in different ways. On one hand, the bond between the Cabinet and the executive
body is weakened, the result being more expertise and less policy. This becomes evident during
the process of drafting various laws and approving the agenda for their adoption. In quite a few
cases the different priorities of the MPs (due to their closer ties with the local electorate) and the
experts in the Cabinet often freeze or delay the adoption of crucial acts of Parliament. On the
other hand, this is a way to protect the Cabinet from fractioning, which usually emerges in the
Bulgarian Parliament even among the majority.
The Ministers of Defense and Interior. The figures of ministers of defense and interior are
core for establishing and practicing democratic control, transparency and initiating comprehensive
defense or police reforms. From a professional point of view military and police staffs are
traditionally conservative organizations where innovations of such type are not encouraged.
Initiatives should come from the ministers and their political cabinets. They have both the authority
and responsibility to initiate legal acts and to provide enough transparency on professional
matters that permit effective engagement of the media and civil society institution in the
oversight of the security sector. In some cases, like the Nichols-Goldwater act in USA significant
professional reforms could be initiated by the members of the Parliament but, however, the
implementation is in the hands of political leadership – of the ministries. In this context the traditional
debate is on the capacity of ministers – should they be “pure politicians” or “experts on the
subject”?