Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Security Sector

Legal Norms and Institutions
What is really important is the set and definitions of criteria to be relevant, useful and understandable.
The criteria should give to the actors of democratic control an instrument for objective
analysis and decisions. For this purpose a set of criteria could be designed based on officially
agreed or mutually accepted documents such as the OSCE Code of Conduct and the
NATO PfP criteria from the Study of NATO Enlargement (1995) and also popular check-lists as
presented by scholars and experts as Chris Donnelly, Marco Carnovale (NATO Review, March
1997), Jeffrey Simon (Joint Force Quarterly, 2000), admiral Henry Gaffney (Center for Naval
Analyses Professional Paper, 1996) and others like the Center for European Security Studies’
project as of 2001, entitled Organizing National Defenses for NATO Membership – The Unexamined
Dimension of Aspirants’ Readiness for Entry (here the criteria are integrated in so-called
“Carnovale-Simon test”).
Part IV
THE LEGAL NORMS AND THE INSTITUTIONS, PROVIDING THE
LEADERSHIP AND THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE SECURITY
SECTOR IN THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
The establishment of the rule of law is at the very heart of a successful transition to and consolidation
of democracy. The adoption and enforcement of constituent legal acts, such as the Constitution,
is of central importance to the rule of law. The transformation of a whole series of state
institutions to serve rule of law, rather than the agencies of repression, is one of the significant
preconditions for both successful transition and progressive consolidation of democracy. While
no single model is in offer, Simon Lunn (Connections no. 4, 2002) has summarized the best
practices in building preconditions for effective democratic control over the armed forces as
follows:
Legal and constitutional mechanisms which clarify the relationships between the head of
state, the government, parliament, and the armed forces in terms of the division of authority,
command, and subordination in both peacetime and the transition to war;
An appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel within MoD (including civilian Minister of
Defense) to ensure that the military expertise is situated in appropriate political and economic
context;
Effective parliamentarian oversight to ensure democratic legitimacy and popular support;
Maximum transparency and openness, including independent research institutes and an
active inquisitive media;
Armed forces at ease with their role in society.
Concerning the definition of democratic control over the armed forces and its mechanisms,
the concept has two aspects. Once it is understood as “civilian” in the sense of “non-military,”
vested to the respective state authorities. In other instances – as “civil” in the sense of “non-
29