Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Security Sector

Mass Media and Public Opinion
The general rule is that a particular piece of information, and not broad categories of
documents, e.g., documents related to the secret services or the Ministry of Defense, should be
classified following clear regulations, established by law. In addition, all such regulations need to
be public and should leave very little room for discretion by the executive agencies. The
executives should be obliged by law to respond to requests for information. If a portion of a
related document is classified, that portion is withheld, or deleted, and the rest of the document
is provided to the inquiring organization or person. Finally, any document or part of a document
may be classified only for a limited period of time, e.g., 10, 15, or 30 years depending on the
level of classification, and after that time expires, the document becomes public.
Expertise, freedom and self-imposed censorship
Every independent media dedicates one or more journalists to monitor continuously the
developments in the security sector. The attitudes of these journalists and their impact on public
opinion largely depend on their expertise and experience, the independence of the media, the
traditions of the country, and the general level of the relationships between society and security
sector organizations.
In democratic countries the media cannot be controlled. Practically every policy decision and
every action of security sector organizations may become subject to public scrutiny. ‘Embedded’
journalists and TV crews are becoming invariable part of the ‘order of battle’ in current
operations. This creates qualitatively new environment and puts a tremendous burden on the
soldiers and other security service personnel. 3 Various attempts have been made to regulate
the relationships between the military and the media, especially in the coverage of ongoing
operations. None of these attempts may be entirely successful, unless journalists and media
leadership have the expertise and the understanding what their actions mean for the success of
the operation and the life of the soldiers and are willing to balance the freedom of information
with self-imposed restraint and even self-censorship.
In the worst case, decisions and actions of the security sector organizations may be
misrepresented and subjected to downright disinformation. 4 Free media does not necessarily
equate with independence. Especially in developing democracies media may be linked with
business cartels and may be used to strengthen their influence and to promote specific
economic and political interests, and not to protect the public interest. 5 The creation of informed
citizens and unbiased public opinion in such cases becomes an extreme challenge.
In addition, the challenges posed by the information revolution, call for a new culture of the
relationships between the media and the security and defense organizations that is based on
3 Chris Donnelly, “Learning from Security Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe,” in Reform and
Reconstruction of the Security Sector, eds., Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Münster, Germany: Lit
Verlag, 2004), pp. 53-54.
4 Ibid.
5 Stoyana Georgieva and Avgustina Tzvetkova, “Media, Civil Society and Public Policy,” in Jan A.
Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri, eds., Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South Easter
Europe: Insights and Perspectives, vol. I (Geneva/Belgrade: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces, 2003), pp. 269-280.
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