Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Security Sector

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Constitutional and Legal Framework
Notwithstanding the relative success of the debate on security and the instruments of exercising
democratic control, a long way needs to be passed – both nationally and internationally,
to reach a satisfactory level of democratic control of the intelligence agencies. There exist factors
that complicate the knowledge of intelligence and of the civil democratic control of the intelligence
institutions: the intermingling of constructive positive issues of the changing role and
tasks of intelligence with overcoming the legacies of the past; the persisting presence of contradictory
theoretic assumptions about democratic oversight and control over the security sector;
the lower level of discussing this issue with NATO, EU and other Western partners; the issues of
the intelligence and security agencies’ activities are definitely the most specific and complex in
the realm of security issues; no bold academic effort has been demonstrated to study the issues
of civil democratic oversight of the intelligence agencies and shape the ‘academic body of
knowledge’ in that field in Bulgaria, and, in the aftermath of the 9/11 events and the new security
needs of fighting terrorism globally this subject turns even more difficult.
There are fundamental questions that need answers in the would-be national debate on the
democratic control of intelligence: what is intelligence; what does the ‘right to know’ of free and
democratic people about intelligence include, and, what is the meaning for the democratic society
of clandestine collection, counterintelligence, analysis and estimates, and covert action.
The popular definition of intelligence should be brought to the minds of the broader public
and the understanding of the specific mechanism of democratic oversight – built-on this perception.
Roy Godson, Georgetown University Professor, President of the National Center for Strategic
Information and President of the US non-governmental Consortium for the Study of Intelligence
describes intelligence as “that knowledge, organization, and activity that results in (1) the
collection, analysis, production, dissemination, and specialized exploitation of information relating
to any other government, political group, party, military force, movement, or other association
that is believed to relate to the group’s or government’s security; (2) the neutralization and
countering of similar activities by other groups, governments, or movements; and (3) the covert
activities undertaken to affect the composition and behavior of such groups or governments.” 2
Godson describes four distinct elements of intelligence: First, clandestine collection which is
obtaining valued information through the use of special, usually secret, human and technical
methods (humint and techint). Second, counterintelligence, which is identifying, neutralizing, and
exploiting other state’s intelligence services. Third, analysis and estimates – that is assessing
collection and other data, and delivering to policymakers a finished product that has more clarity
than may be inherent in the data alone, and, fourth, covert action, which is attempting to influence
politics and events in other states without revealing one’s involvement. Godson underlines
the symbiotic relationship, especially the operational one, between the elements. 3
The “right to know” in democratic societies disqualifies the concerns about intelligence as
the sole source of the debate on secrecy. Open government is an essential component of the
Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives – A Self-Assessment Study,
Volume I: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia (Geneva/Belgrade: Geneva Centre for DCAF, 2003), pp. 234-236.
2 Roy Godson, Intelligence and National Security, in: Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, Ted Greenwood
(eds.), Security Studies for the 1990s (Washington, New York, London: Brassey’s /US/, A Maxwell Macmillan
Company, 1993), p. 213.
3 Op. cit., p. 213-214.