Naval Operations Concept - Defense Technical Information Center

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Naval Operations Concept 2010 saries may not be deterred with nuclear or conventional retaliation, and may actually seek to elicit a U.S. reprisal to support their own strategic objectives. As described in previous chapters, U.S. forces are required to conduct a variety of military tasks, equally capable of globally distributed or regionally concentrated projection of both “hard power” and “soft power” as appropriate. This presents a challenge for naval forces—maintaining their advantages to prevent and deter conflict through nuclear and conventional means while evolving new, non-traditional deterrence capabilities. Central Idea Effective deterrence requires a comprehensive effort that includes all elements of national power. In support of this expanded approach, the Naval Service will employ a broader set of capabilities to assure partners, dissuade adversaries, and deter or limit hostile action. These include continued nuclear and conventional combat preeminence, as well as new capabilities to deter evolving threats posed by an array of current and potential adversaries. CS-21 calls for the naval forces to build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests with an unprecedented level of cooperation within the Naval Service and the other instruments of national power and U.S. international partners. In this environment, deterrent effects are achieved through the inherent combat power of forward postured naval task forces, as well as globally distributed mission-tailored forces engaged in fostering, expanding and strengthening cooperative relationships, promoting stable and prosperous regional conditions, and preventing crises. An Expanded Deterrence Framework Deployed naval forces are uniquely suited to this expanded approach to deterrence. They possess a credible and scalable ability to deter state and non-state adversaries using nuclear and conventional means. Through their inherent ability to maneuver, largely unfettered by diplomatic challenges to access and presence, naval forces support a wide range of credible deterrence options. To sustain this core capability, naval forces must continue to develop a broad and enduring deterrence portfolio by maintaining nuclear and conventional capability advantages, including sea-based ballistic missile defense (BMD).
In addition, globally distributed naval forces—postured forward and in coordination with U.S. Government and international sea service partners—generate an expanded and non-traditional set of preventative deterrent effects through partnerships, cooperative security and engagement. These prevention activities, focused on addressing regional, transnational, and global security challenges, are designed to limit the influence and constrain the actions of rogue governments and non-state actors. Collectively, this cumulative and mutually supporting framework provides U.S. national leadership with expanded deterrence options across a range of security challenges, and is the expanded deterrence capability the Nation requires. Nuclear Deterrence The backbone of the Nation’s survivable nuclear deterrent will continue to be provided by the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force and its supporting command and control (C2) architecture. This demonstrated capability provides an enduring and credible deterrent against any state that would threaten, or actually employ, nuclear weapons. SSBNs serve as the ultimate guarantor of the U.S. assured second-strike capability. They are designed specifically for stealth and the precision delivery of nuclear warheads. As a virtually undetectable and survivable launch platform, SSBNs ensure that the United States will have sufficient nuclear forces to inflict unacceptable consequences on an adversary in response to a nuclear attack. . We will continue to provide a nuclear deterrent that is persistent and maintained in a ready posture, while remaining subject to firm C2 procedures and protected from conventional or irregular attack. The credibility and survivability upon which this deterrence rests is dependent upon robust acoustic and non-acoustic stealth, reliable longrange missiles, and an adaptable employment concept capable of holding adversaries at risk anywhere on the globe. To maintain a robust, secure and survivable nuclear deterrent, we will develop the technologies and communications architecture necessary to support the next generation of sea-based strategic deterrence. Chapter Deterrence
Page 1 and 2:
Naval Operations Concept 2010 Imple
Page 3 and 4:
Preface The daily service and sacri
Page 6 and 7:
The pathway of man’s journey thro
Page 8 and 9:
Nor must Uncle Sam’s web-feet be
Page 10 and 11:
Naval Operations Concept 2010 Scope
Page 12:
Naval Operations Concept 2010 Annex
Page 15 and 16:
Chapter The Naval Service We will a
Page 17 and 18:
the seams between water, land, and
Page 20 and 21:
Naval operational maneuver is a gre
Page 22 and 23:
Naval Operations Concept 2010 has b
Page 24 and 25:
Naval Operations Concept 2010 6 mak
Page 26 and 27:
Naval Operations Concept 2010 Mindf
Page 28 and 29:
Naval Operations Concept 2010 0 con
Page 30:
Naval Operations Concept 2010 Naval
Page 33 and 34: Chapter Forward Presence The naval
Page 35 and 36: combatant ships with fuel, food, pa
Page 37 and 38: over time to achieve sustainable im
Page 39 and 40: of the world, surface ships, attack
Page 42 and 43: Many of today’s maritime threats
Page 44 and 45: Naval Operations Concept 2010 6 mar
Page 46 and 47: Naval Operations Concept 2010 State
Page 48 and 49: Naval Operations Concept 2010 0 End
Page 50 and 51: Naval Operations Concept 2010 will
Page 52 and 53: For in this modern world, the instr
Page 54 and 55: Naval Operations Concept 2010 6 dis
Page 56: Naval Operations Concept 2010 React
Page 59 and 60: Chapter Sea Control As long as the
Page 61 and 62: n Theater anti-access weapons, incl
Page 63 and 64: techniques and procedures. The requ
Page 65 and 66: n Increased operational range and e
Page 67 and 68: Chapter Power Projection Amphibious
Page 69 and 70: An amphibious assault involves esta
Page 71 and 72: achieve assigned power projection o
Page 73 and 74: Gaining and Maintaining Operational
Page 75 and 76: Enhanced MAGTF operations incorpora
Page 77 and 78: Naval Expeditionary Logistics The a
Page 80 and 81: Lying offshore, ready to act, the p
Page 84 and 85: Naval Operations Concept 2010 6 Con
Page 86 and 87: Naval Operations Concept 2010 of th
Page 88 and 89: A powerful navy we have always rega
Page 90 and 91: Naval Operations Concept 2010 Oppor
Page 92 and 93: Naval Operations Concept 2010 Naval
Page 94 and 95: Naval Operations Concept 2010 6 Mar
Page 96 and 97: Naval Operations Concept 2010 Incre
Page 98 and 99: Naval Operations Concept 2010 0 The
Page 100 and 101: Naval Operations Concept 2010 Table
Page 102 and 103: Naval Operations Concept 2010 Annex
Page 104 and 105: Naval Operations Concept 2010 6 Ann
Page 106 and 107: Naval Operations Concept 2010 infor
Page 108 and 109: Naval Operations Concept 2010 00 En
Page 110: 0 Naval Operations Concept 2010 32
show all

Naval Operations Concept - Defense Technical Information Center

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?