Trading with the enemy in Mitrovica, Kosovo. - RUhosting

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During 1998 the KLA continued its attacks in rural areas and Serbian security forces retaliated strongly, leaving 300.000 Albanians homeless before a ceasefire was agreed to in October. In February 1999 fighting resumed and the 'Contact Group' (consisting of the U.S., UK, Germany, France, Italy and Russia) summoned both sides to talks in Rambouillet, France. Here an 'Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo' was proposed but this was unacceptable to Serbia because it opened the possibility for Kosovo independence. Fighting resumed and was eventually stopped by an 78 days bombing campaign by NATO, unauthorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The international community quickly took over in Kosovo. “In June the UNSC passed Resolution 1244, mandating KFOR's presence and an UN interim administration (UNMIK) to establish and oversee Kosovo provisional democratic institutions of self-government with a framework of Yugoslav sovereignty, pending a final settlement which was to take full account of the Ramouillet accords”. In 2001 “UNMIK promulgated a Constitutional Framework, enabling parliamentary elections, appointment of a president and provisional government (PISG). It demarcated the spheres of UNMIK's fundamental “reserved” powers from those that could be transferred to the PISG”. -ICG, Conflict History: Kosovo In short, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo took over control of the state right after the conflict ended, with NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) as a peacekeeping force on the ground. Since then the UN has been transferring authority to the newly build democratic institutions of Kosovo. One of the most influential UNMIK policies since 2002 was the “standards before status” policy, which basically said that before the Kosovo status would be decided Kosovo needed to have certain standards which were operationalised by defining a variety of the to be achieved benchmarks 6 . Transferring power from the UN to the local institutions, and negotiations about Kosovo's final status would continue until the 17 th of February 2008, when Kosovo declared its independence of Serbia. The international community present in Kosovo since the end of the conflict in 1999 was not able to prevent further violence though, which was now mainly aimed at the Serbian population. During every phase of the conflict in Kosovo, including the years before the violent conflict of 1998-1999 and the years after it, all ethnic groups in Kosovo suffered. It seems that before and during the violent conflict the Serbs played a bigger role in perpetrating inter-ethnic violence than Albanians, and after the war these roles switched. Before the conflict under the rule of Milošević Albanians were oppressed, and during the conflict Kosovo was ethnically cleansed of them (Malcolm, 2002). The tactics used by Serbs for this were almost always the 6 International Crisis Group. Conflict History: Kosovo http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=58 visited on 05-08- 2009 35
same: First an Albanian village which was believed to have ties with the KLA was shelled, then the people who didn't flee were killed, tortured and/or raped, and most of the houses looted and burned (CARE, 2006). The political objective was to get Albanians out of Kosovo and make sure they would not return (Malcolm, 2002). The individual motivator for Serbian individuals was mainly the opportunity for looting (CARE, 2006). These activities, in combination with the NATO bombings caused over 700.000 Albanians to flee or be forced out of Kosovo by 20 April 1999, and 850.000 Albanians to be internally displaced within Kosovo (Malcolm, 2002).When the violent conflict ended and Milošević withdrew his troops from Kosovo on June 10, 1999, Albanians spontaneously started returning home. At the end of July 1999, 740.000 Albanians had returned. Over the course of that summer 150.000 K-Serbs and their alleged Roma collaborators fled to Serbia Proper, Northern Kosovo or mono-ethnic enclaves fearing, or experiencing, violence from K- Albanians (CARE, 2006). OSCE: “Violence has taken many forms: Killings, rape, beatings, torture, house-burning and abductions. Not all violence has been physical, however, fear and terror tactics have been used as weapons of revenge. Sustained aggression, even without physical injury, exerts extreme pressure, leaving people not only unable to move outside their home, but unable to live peacefully within their home. In many instances, fear has generated silence, in turn allowing the climate of impunity to go unchecked.” (CARE, 2006) Between June and December 1999 there were 454 Murders, 190 kidnappings and 1327 incidents of intentional burning of property. During January 2000 – June 2000 these numbers had decreased to 1/3 th of this (CARE, 2006). This trend continued in 2001: there was increased security and mobility for minorities but still harassment and intimidation. The violence decreased because of various reasons. First, the violence was probably emotional and out of revenge, these motives faded away over time (field notes). Also, since Serbs were fleeing to mono-ethnic areas this made them less likely to be attacked. Last, because of the “standards before status” policy it was in the best interest of Albanians to respect minorities and this could have motivated them to shy away from violence. This last factor was the most important one according to some Albanians I spoke with while in Kosovo. Another event which seriously damaged inter-ethnic relations were the riots of 2004. On March the 17 th - 18 th , 2004, thousands of Albanians - mostly high school students - went out on the streets to protest against the drowning of three Albanian children in Mitrovica for which Serbs were blamed. This resulted mainly in the destruction of property: many Serbian houses, graveyards, monuments and churches were attacked. The riots led to exchanges of gunfire in Mitrovica, and some other areas, leaving nearly 700 wounded and 19 dead (International Crisis Group, 2004). After the riots of 2004 the situation in Kosovo has been much more stable with little incidents of inter-ethnic 36
Page 1 and 2: Nijmegen School of Management, Radb
Page 3 and 4: TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.
Page 5 and 6: CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION “Sixteen
Page 7 and 8: Governmental Organisations (IGO's)
Page 9 and 10: 1.4. Thesis organisation - Short ou
Page 11 and 12: I learned a lot from it, as I found
Page 13 and 14: Of the seventeen people interviewed
Page 15 and 16: interesting experience was organisi
Page 17 and 18: Mitrovica Serb admitted that when h
Page 19 and 20: CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK "P
Page 21 and 22: 4. Trade encourages the broader exp
Page 23 and 24: Miljacka River, separating the Serb
Page 25 and 26: This part of inter-ethnic trade can
Page 27 and 28: For the largest part of the past 60
Page 29 and 30: “Because of such dissatisfactions
Page 31 and 32: sent all colonists back to Kosovo.
Page 33 and 34: Conditions have improved and the de
Page 35: Albanians reacted to these new poli
Page 39 and 40: Data from the SOK is sometimes used
Page 41 and 42: the highest aid per capita ever giv
Page 43 and 44: Country % of Export % of Import Alb
Page 45 and 46: which were in turn disbanded in fav
Page 47 and 48: Another similarity between both com
Page 49 and 50: situation developed in favour of th
Page 51 and 52: its economic situation. Mitrovica u
Page 53 and 54: CHAPTER 5: RESULTS Placing inter-et
Page 55 and 56: Albanian” and by Serbs associated
Page 57 and 58: “But I will never accept the inde
Page 59 and 60: Another important reason why reconc
Page 61 and 62: “Everything that happens in Mitro
Page 63 and 64: August 2009 with violent protests a
Page 65 and 66: nationalists” because he believes
Page 67 and 68: (respondent #4). A Serb working in
Page 69 and 70: CHAPTER 6: RESULTS Views on the eff
Page 71 and 72: elieves inter-ethnic trade will imp
Page 73 and 74: Trader 3. Respondent #7, an Albania
Page 75 and 76: daughter of his sister who went to
Page 77 and 78: issues. On top of that you have to
Page 79 and 80: towards their colleagues of the oth
Page 81 and 82: that even if the legal or the grey
Page 83 and 84: 2004. Second, Blanton argues that "
Page 85 and 86: REFERENCES Andreas, P. (2004). The
Page 87 and 88:
Lagazio, M., & Russett, B. (2004).
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