The Sikh Turban: Post-911 Challenges to This Article of Faith

Those responsible for planning the 9/11 attacks, most notably bin Laden, also
wear turbans and long beards. 94 This physical similarity resulted in a serious backlash
against Sikhs, who are “conflated with bin Laden” and his cronies 95 —despite the separate
doctrinal views, different geographic homeland, different native languages, and distinct
turban styles of Sikhs. 96
This section presents examples of anti-Sikh discrimination in America after 9/11
in multiple contexts. 97 It also notes the actual and possible legal resolutions of the
incidents, where appropriate. While this discussion focuses on Sikhs, it is important to
remember that the post-9/11 backlash impacted not only Sikhs, but Muslims and all those
perceived to be Muslim, including Arabs and South Asians. 98
Americans, and therein lines the very cruel irony of the Sikh American experience since
the 11th.”).
94 According to one survey, “nine out of 10 educated Americans identified Sikhs with
Muslims.” Osama becomes a pain for American Sikhs, THE FIN. EXPRESS, July 10, 2006,
available at http://www.financialexpress.com/latest_full_story.php?content_id=133438.
95 Volpp, supra note 3, at 1590. See also Stromer, supra note 11, at 740 (“Since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, videos and images of Osama bin Laden have
created an air of hostility towards Sikhs, with an uninformed American public equating
the appearance of Sikh men with bin Laden’s beard and Afghani-style turban.”).
96 See discussion of Sikhs, supra Part I. See also Pratheep Sevanthinathan, Shifting from
Race to Ethnicity in Higher Education, 9 SCHOLAR 1, 36 (2006) (“Although the Sikh
are from northern India, speak languages altogether different than Arabic, and are not
Islamic, most people who look at a Sikh will associate that person with an Arab country
because Sikh’s wear turbans, and turbans are commonly associated with Muslims.”). The
attack against turbaned Sikhs, who “stick out” because of their headdresses, is also
curious given the fact that the al Qaeda operatives intended to blend into American
society. See MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, AMERICA’S CHALLENGES: DOMESTIC
SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 7 (2003),
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Americas_Challenges.pdf (“al Qaeda’s
hijackers were carefully chosen to avoid detection: all but two were educated young men
from middle-class families with no criminal records and no known connection to
terrorism.”).
97 The individual incidents are discussed descriptively. Questions of larger responsibility
for this backlash, including any government influence, is beyond the scope of this
discussion. See Ahmad, supra note 8, at 1319 (exploring the relationship between the
government response to terrorism and private reactions to Muslim-looking people).
98 Though the post-9/11 backlash has affected these groups, the exact number of bias
incidents against them is unclear. See Rachel Saloom, I Know You Are, But What am I?
Arab-American Experiences Through the Critical Race Theory Lens, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POL’Y 55, 71 (2005) (claiming that Human Rights Watch “argues that the full extent
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