The Sikh Turban: Post-911 Challenges to This Article of Faith

employer’s directives, Singh eventually and reluctantly agreed to wear a logo on his
turban. 169
The Sikh Coalition has filed suit on behalf of Singh. 170 The DOJ has also filed
suit on behalf of Singh. The case is still pending as of February 2008.
If the Jaggi and Rathour cases were precedential, should have a strong case
against the MTA. It should be noted, however, that the Jaggi and Rathour resolutions
were ultimately reached via settlement, not via judicial determination.
What of the courts? Some legal scholars, including Circuit Judge Michael W.
McConnell, have claimed that the courts have eviscerated religious rights in the
workplace, 171 a situation that would ostensibly imperil turbaned Sikhs from bringing
successful Title VII claims. For example, the Supreme Court has held that employers
need not bear more than a de minimis cost to accommodate religious employees, 172 and
that employers are not required to accept a particular accommodation suggested by the
employee. 173 Courts have also allowed employers to defend themselves against undue
hardship by claiming that the accommodation would negatively affect business
operations, 174 impose on co-worker rights, 175 or endanger public health or safety. 176
169 Id.
170 See id.
171 See Michael W. McConnell, Symposium, Religion in the Workplace: Proceedings of
the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Law
and Religion, 4 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 87, 98 (2000) (noting that “the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Hardison and Philbrook have made mincemeat of the congressional
intention in Title VII.”); see also Thomas D. Brierton, “‘Reasonable Accommodation’”
Under Title VII: Is it Reasonable to the Religious Employee, 42 CATH. LAW. 165, 182-
186 (2002) (describing the ways in which the “[t]he courts have weakened reasonable
accommodation rights in the workplace[.]”) [hereinafter Reasonable Accommodation].
172 See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (“To require TWA to bear more than a
de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”).
173 See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986) (“We find no basis in
either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any
particular reasonable accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any
reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation
obligation.”).
174 See EEOC v. Sambo’s of Ga. Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (N.D.Ga. 1981) (disagreeing
that “customer preference is an insufficient justification or defense as a matter of law[.]”).
175 See Weber v. Roadway Express Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that
an accommodation is “more than a de minimis expense because [it] unduly burdens his
co-workers.”).
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