Network Coding and Wireless Physical-layer ... - Jacobs University
Network Coding and Wireless Physical-layer ... - Jacobs University
Network Coding and Wireless Physical-layer ... - Jacobs University
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92<br />
Chapter 7: <strong>Physical</strong>-<strong>layer</strong> Key Encoding for <strong>Wireless</strong> <strong>Physical</strong>-<strong>layer</strong> Secret-key<br />
Generation (WPSG) with Unequal Security Protection (USP)<br />
used to achieve perfect secrecy in Section 7.3.<br />
However, perfect secrecy for the key encoding scheme may require key input that is<br />
too long to be economical, especially if the number of vulnerable key bits is large. In the<br />
case of scalable data, such as video data, perfect secrecy is not required for the whole<br />
data. Even though low-priority parts in the data do not have perfect secrecy, the enemy<br />
cryptanalyst will have no idea at all about the data if high-priority parts are properly<br />
protected. From now on, we will call this concept “scalable security” or “unequal security<br />
protection (USP).”<br />
Previous research on scalable security is discussed in Section 7.4. After that, we propose<br />
a new framework in Section 7.5 to provide scalable security services to the application<br />
<strong>layer</strong>. This framework allows the application <strong>layer</strong> to specify some design parameters according<br />
to its scalable security requirements, which, as shown in Sections 7.6 <strong>and</strong> 7.7,<br />
can be realized in the contexts of secure network coding <strong>and</strong> physical-<strong>layer</strong> key encoding,<br />
respectively. In the end, Section 7.8 concludes the chapter <strong>and</strong> suggests some future<br />
research.<br />
7.1 Introduction to <strong>Physical</strong>-<strong>layer</strong> Key Encoding for<br />
a One-Time-Pad Encryptor<br />
As demonstrated in Sections 6.2 <strong>and</strong> 6.5 of Chapter 6, vulnerable key symbols that can be<br />
estimated by an eavesdropper exist in high proportion if there are too few scatterers in the<br />
environment, the eavesdropper is located near either the transmitter or the receiver, or,<br />
in the case of relay communication, the pilot transmission protocol is insecure. Moreover,<br />
although the eavesdropper is nowhere near the transmitter or receiver during transmission,<br />
he or she may have been there before <strong>and</strong> it is possible that channel coefficients (especially<br />
the amplitudes) do not change much. Therefore, assuming that he or she can correctly<br />
predict some key symbols, we should try to find some countermeasures. To do so, we<br />
adopt a similar concept to Shamir’s secret sharing [9] <strong>and</strong> Cai <strong>and</strong> Yeung’s secure network