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Network Coding and Wireless Physical-layer ... - Jacobs University

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Chapter 4: Unequal Erasure Protection (UEP) in <strong>Network</strong> <strong>Coding</strong> 53<br />

of GEK allocation, e.g., if R 1 is allowed to allocate only one GEK, it will choose the best<br />

one <strong>and</strong> assign it to T 4 . If two allotments are allowed, R 1 will assign two GEKs to T 4<br />

<strong>and</strong> T 3 . The preference order relates to the erasure probability of each edge-disjoint path<br />

discussed in earlier sections. Each sink’s main preference is to allocate the GEKs with<br />

lower UEP levels to the paths with lower erasure probability. This means, according to<br />

Table 4.4, the path from the source that reaches R 1 via T 4 has lower erasure probability<br />

than those reaching R 1 via T 3 <strong>and</strong> T 1 .<br />

Let each receiver’s estimate of its marginal values θ 1 , θ 2 , <strong>and</strong> θ 3 , as defined in Definition<br />

4.8 be shown below.<br />

Θ R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4<br />

θ 1 123 75 85 45<br />

θ 2 113 5 65 25<br />

θ 3 40 3 7 5<br />

Now, let the auction start with the initial price of 10.<br />

At this price, R 1 is happy<br />

to buy three allotments, while R 2 will buy only one, since the price exceeds the second<br />

marginal value. Accordingly, the response from each receiver is shown in the first row of<br />

Table 4.5.<br />

Table 4.5: The sinks’ responses to the increasing price<br />

.<br />

Sinks R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4<br />

Responses to 10 3 1 2 2<br />

Responses to 25 3 1 2 1<br />

Responses to 25+ɛ 3 1 1 1<br />

Responses to 40 2 1 1 1<br />

Since nobody clinches anything at this point, the source node raises the price. When<br />

the price reaches 25, R 4 has no profit to be gained from the second allotment, <strong>and</strong> therefore<br />

changes its response, as shown in the second row of Table 4.5.<br />

From R 1 ’s perspective, the dem<strong>and</strong> of all other bidders is four, while five allotments<br />

are available. If other sinks bid monotonically, R 1 is now guaranteed to win at least one<br />

allotment. Thus, according to our rule, R 1 clinches one allotment at the price of 25. It

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