Network Coding and Wireless Physical-layer ... - Jacobs University
Network Coding and Wireless Physical-layer ... - Jacobs University
Network Coding and Wireless Physical-layer ... - Jacobs University
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116 Chapter 8: Summary, Conclusion, <strong>and</strong> Future Works<br />
spatial probability density<br />
2.5<br />
2<br />
1.5<br />
1<br />
0.5<br />
0<br />
1<br />
0.8<br />
0.6<br />
0.4<br />
y<br />
0.2<br />
0<br />
0<br />
0.2<br />
0.4<br />
x<br />
0.6<br />
0.8<br />
1<br />
Figure 8.3: The normalized mobility component of the spatial node distribution in the<br />
RWP model<br />
do other nodes know that the channel is dropped?<br />
8.2.3 Economics of UEP <strong>Network</strong> <strong>Coding</strong><br />
The auction problem considered in our previous work [3] is only one specific economic<br />
problem among many. There are two more problems that we would like to investigate,<br />
the bargaining problem <strong>and</strong> the hierarchical network coding game.<br />
The Bargaining Problem of UEP <strong>Network</strong> <strong>Coding</strong><br />
The bargaining problem is a non-zero-sum game which allows some cooperation among<br />
p<strong>layer</strong>s. Let us consider network coding in a butterfly network in Fig. 8.4(a). Our knowledge<br />
about UEP network coding tells us that D obtains better data quality if b 1 is of<br />
higher priority than b 2 <strong>and</strong> every edge has the same erasure probability. Indeed, D may<br />
have won an auction over E to obtain this network coding pattern. However, D <strong>and</strong> E<br />
may reach an agreement that, when the edge AB alone is failing or having lots of erasures,<br />
the network coding pattern in Fig. 8.4(b) is used instead. This is beneficial for both D<br />
<strong>and</strong> E.<br />
We aim at exploring the conditions under which bargaining is beneficial as well as the<br />
optimal bargain in numerical values for each receiver in a generalized network.