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University of Botswana Law Journal - PULP

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UNREPRESENTED ACCUSED IN BOTSWANA 107<br />

In the case <strong>of</strong> Mosanana v The State, 107 the appellant had been<br />

charged under the Stock Theft Act 108 on two counts <strong>of</strong> receiving stolen stock<br />

which she either knew or had reason to believe had been stolen. The appellant<br />

was acquitted on the substantive counts but convicted on lesser charges <strong>of</strong><br />

receiving stock without having reasonable cause for believing at the time <strong>of</strong><br />

acquisition that such stock was the property <strong>of</strong> the person from whom it was<br />

received. The evidence showed that the appellant was given the cattle by a<br />

debtor, in satisfaction <strong>of</strong> a debt owed by the latter to the former. At the time,<br />

the appellant was sick and in bed, but asked one Opelo to check the cattle. As<br />

a result <strong>of</strong> the appellant’s conversation with Opelo, she was satisfied that the<br />

cattle belonged to the debtor. While the cattle were unbranded, Opelo testified<br />

that other cattle <strong>of</strong> that age in <strong>Botswana</strong> are not usually branded. In reaching a<br />

decision, the magistrate relied on section 4 <strong>of</strong> the Stock Theft Act which<br />

provided that:<br />

“A person who in any manner, otherwise than at a public sale,<br />

acquires or receives into his possession from any other person stolen<br />

stock or stolen produce without having reasonable cause, pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

which shall be on such first-mentioned person, for believing at the<br />

time <strong>of</strong> such acquisition or receipt that such stock or produce was<br />

the property <strong>of</strong> the person from whom he received it or that such<br />

person was duly authorised by the owner there<strong>of</strong> to deal with it or<br />

dispose <strong>of</strong> it, shall be deemed to be guilty <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence.”<br />

The magistrate found that the appellant did not prove that she had<br />

reasonable cause for believing that the cattle belonged to the debtor. The<br />

Court, on appeal, disagreed with this finding. The Court stated that the<br />

appellant did show that she had reasonable cause for believing that the cattle<br />

belonged to the debtor. The Court stated that the appellant did ask Opelo to<br />

check the cattle and that the latter found nothing amiss. It was also the<br />

evidence <strong>of</strong> Opelo that he found nothing unusual with unbranded cattle. Over<br />

and above this, the Court stated the duty <strong>of</strong> judicial <strong>of</strong>ficers where an<br />

106 For some articles on reverse onus clauses, see R.J.V. Cole, “Determining the Constitutionality <strong>of</strong> Reverse<br />

Onus Clauses in <strong>Botswana</strong>,” 16(2) African <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> International and Comparative <strong>Law</strong> (2008), p. 236;<br />

A. Ashworth, “Article 6 and the Fairness <strong>of</strong> Trials,” Criminal <strong>Law</strong> Review (1999), p. 261; A. Ashworth,<br />

“Four Threats to the Presumption <strong>of</strong> Innocence,” 123(1) South African <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Journal</strong> (2006), p. 63; A.A.S.<br />

Zuckerman, “No Third Exception to the Woolmington Rule,” 103 <strong>Law</strong> Quarterly Review (1987), p. 170;<br />

C.R.M. Dlamini, “Presumptions in the South African <strong>Law</strong> <strong>of</strong> Evidence III,” 65(1) Tydskrif vir<br />

Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (2002), p. 147; F. Egonda-Ntende, “Presumption <strong>of</strong> Innocence and<br />

the Reverse Onus Clause: Does the 1995 Uganda Constitution Establish A New Standard?,” 9(2) East<br />

African <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Peace and Human Rights (2003), p. 194; P. Roberts, “Taking the Burden <strong>of</strong> Pro<strong>of</strong><br />

Seriously,” Criminal <strong>Law</strong> Review (1995), p. 783; K. Govender, “Determining the Constitutionality <strong>of</strong><br />

Presumptions,” 8 South African <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Criminal Justice (1995), p. 205; C.R. Nesson, “Reasonable<br />

Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value <strong>of</strong> Complexity,” 92(6) Harvard <strong>Law</strong> Review (1979), p.<br />

1187.<br />

107 [1985] B.L.R. 29.<br />

108 Cap 09:01, 1973. Now replaced by the Stock Theft Act Cap 09:01, Act 21 <strong>of</strong> 1996.

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