SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY The Fourth Amendment and ...

injury to his intended victim, to a
bystander, or even to himself."
However, apparently putting a suspect into a
locked patrol vehicle while unhandcuffed is
sufficient to trigger the rule of Gant. (See
United States v. Ruckes (9 th Cir. 2009) 586
F.3 rd 713; issue not discussed.)
Gant’s Alternative Theory: The Gant Court, however, also
mentions that there is a second legal theory justifying the
warrantless search of a vehicle, incident to arrest, even if
the suspect has been removed from the vehicle and secured:
I.e., when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest might be found in the car.” (Id., 129
S.Ct. at p. 1719.)
Note: The Supreme Court in Gant mentions this as
an “alternate” theory justifying the warrantless
search of a vehicle incident to arrest, but fails to
explain when and how it is applicable, merely citing
Thornton v. United States, supra, as authority for
its application.
Thornton v. United States, supra, at pp. 629-632 (a
concurring opinion), describes its applicability to
vehicle searches citing as its authority United States
v. Rabinowitz (1950) 339 U.S. 56 [94 L.Ed. 653].
United States v. Rabinowitz, supra, is a case
involving the warrantless search of a business
office, however, based upon probable cause, itself
being severely criticized later in Chimel v.
California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 759-768 [23
L.Ed.2d 685].
Also, the phrase “reasonable to believe” is not
defined (e.g., “probable cause” or “reasonable
suspicion?”) Neither are the other legal parameters
(e.g., is it limited to the passenger area of the car,
must it be contemporaneous with the arrest in time
and place, etc.?) even discussed.
© 2012 Robert C. Phillips. All rights reserved
Note: A “reasonable suspicion” is probably
all that is required in that warrantless vehicle
searches based upon “probable cause” are
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