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SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY The Fourth Amendment and ...

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ensuing st<strong>and</strong>off does not dissipate that exigency to where officers are<br />

expected to seek the authorization of a judge to take the suspect into physical<br />

custody. (Fisher v. City of San Jose (9 th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3 rd 1069;<br />

overruling its prior holding (at 509 F.3 rd 952) where it was ruled that failure<br />

to obtain an arrest warrant during a 12 hour st<strong>and</strong>off resulted in an illegal<br />

arrest of the barricaded suspect.)<br />

Entry of a residence to execute a bench warrant, issued by a neutral<br />

magistrate upon a defendant’s failure to appear in court, is lawful despite<br />

the fact that the bench warrant was issued without a finding of probable<br />

cause. (United States v. Gooch (9 th Cir. 2007) 506 F.3 rd 1156.)<br />

But, before a police officer may enter a home, absent consent to<br />

enter, the officer must have a reasonable belief, falling short of<br />

probable cause to believe, the suspect lives there <strong>and</strong> is present at<br />

the time. (People v. Downey (2011) 198 Cal.App.4 th 652, 657-<br />

662.)<br />

But see prior decisions finding that “probable cause” to<br />

believe the person who is the subject of the arrest warrant is<br />

actually inside at the time is the correct st<strong>and</strong>ard. (People<br />

v. Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3 rd 472; United States v. Gorman<br />

(9 th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3 rd 1105; People v. Phillips (9 th Cir.<br />

1974) 497 F.2 nd 1131; United States v. Diaz (9 th Cir. 2007)<br />

491 F.3 rd 1074; United States v. Gooch, supra, at p. 1159,<br />

fn. 2; Cuevas v. De Roco (9 th Cir. 2008) 531 F.3 rd 726;<br />

United States v. Mayer (9 th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3 rd 1099,<br />

1103-1104.)<br />

See “Sufficiency of Evidence to Believe the Suspect is Inside,”<br />

below.<br />

“Because an arrest warrant authorizes the police to deprive a person of his<br />

liberty, it necessarily also authorizes a limited invasion of that person's<br />

privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home.” (Steagald<br />

v. United States (981) 451 U.S. 204, 214-215, fn. 7 [68 L.Ed.2 nd 38, 46].)<br />

“Thus, for <strong>Fourth</strong> <strong>Amendment</strong> purposes, an arrest warrant founded on<br />

probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a<br />

dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the<br />

suspect is within.” (Italics added; Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S.<br />

573, 603 [63 L.Ed.2 nd 639, 661].)<br />

“It is not disputed that until the point of Buie's arrest the police had the<br />

right, based on the authority of the arrest warrant, to search anywhere in<br />

© 2012 Robert C. Phillips. All rights reserved<br />

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