30.06.2014 Views

SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY The Fourth Amendment and ...

SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY The Fourth Amendment and ...

SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY The Fourth Amendment and ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Aerial Surveillance: 0verflights over a suspect’s backyard (i.e., within the<br />

“curtilage” of the home), so long as the observers are in the legal (“navigable”)<br />

airspace, when naked-eye observations of illegal activity below are made, are<br />

legal, whether the observers are on routine patrol or are responding to a specific<br />

tip <strong>and</strong>/or otherwise purposely looking into the defendant’s yard. (California v.<br />

Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207 [90 L.Ed.2 nd 210].)<br />

California’s previous rule that observations of contrab<strong>and</strong> within the<br />

curtilage of one’s home (i.e., the yard) under such circumstances should be<br />

suppressed (see People v. Cook (1985) 41 Cal.3 rd 373; People v. Ciraolo<br />

(1984) 161 Cal.App.3 rd 1081.) was overruled in California v. Ciraolo,<br />

supra. Passage of Proposition 8 in June, 1982, dictates that California<br />

follow the federal rule.<br />

<strong>The</strong> federal Environmental Protection Agency’s use of aerial photography,<br />

flying at the legal “navigable altitude,” was held to be within its statutory<br />

authority, as a regulatory <strong>and</strong> enforcement agency requires no explicit<br />

authorization to employ methods of observation available to the public.<br />

Additionally, the taking of photographs of petitioner's complex from<br />

navigable airspace was not a search prohibited by the <strong>Fourth</strong><br />

<strong>Amendment</strong>. (Dow Chemical Co. v. United States (1986) 476 U.S. 227<br />

[90 L.Ed.2 nd 226].)<br />

Overflights conducted by officers of a greenhouse situated 125 yards from<br />

a two-story residence did not constitute a search requiring a warrant under<br />

the <strong>Fourth</strong> <strong>Amendment</strong>. (United States v. Broadhurst (9 th Cir. 1986)<br />

805 F.2 nd 849, 849-850, 856-857.)<br />

Electronic Tracking Devices (Transmitters):<br />

General Rule: Electronic tracking devices are lawful to use in tracking, so<br />

long as the route used is otherwise open to view <strong>and</strong> so long as the<br />

installation of the tracking device itself was not accomplished in violation<br />

of the <strong>Fourth</strong> <strong>Amendment</strong>. (United States v. Knotts (1983) 460 U.S. 276<br />

[75 L.Ed.2 nd 55]; but see United States v. Jones. infra.)<br />

However, the act of putting a tracking device (e.g., a “Global Positioning<br />

System,” or “GPS”) onto a vehicle, even the exterior or undercarriage, is a<br />

<strong>Fourth</strong> <strong>Amendment</strong> search. (United States v. Jones (Jan. 23, 2012) __<br />

U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 945; 181 L.Ed.2 nd 911].)<br />

© 2012 Robert C. Phillips. All rights reserved<br />

<strong>The</strong> Court in Jones did not indicate, however, whether a search<br />

warrant would be necessary, declining to rule on whether such a<br />

search, even if warrantless, was “reasonable” under the<br />

circumstances because that argument had been “forfeited” when<br />

589

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!