test_pdf.pdf

ASSESSING
THE RECORD
OF ARMS
CONTROL
for hostile purposes. And the focus of this new process is on things like strengthening controls over pathogens and
encouraging countries to pass national implementing legislation.
Expectations are relatively low, at least based on the first meetings of countries participating in this new BWC
process, that much of significance will come out of this. But the real problem is that whatever does materialize will
not fundamentally address the key issue confronting the BWC, and that is the continuing concern that a number of
countries are pursuing biological weapons programs. In recent years, as is known, the U.S. government has said that
more than a dozen countries are believed to either have or be pursuing biological weapons.
Outside of the treaty, the key holdouts, if you will, about which there are concerns, are Egypt, Israel, and Syria.
Within the treaty, the U.S. government has identified Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and China as being BW
proliferators, as having illicit BW programs contrary to the terms of the BWC. And several other countries have also
been mentioned: India, Pakistan, Sudan, and Taiwan, which of course has a special status, a complicated status with
respect to international treaties.
As everyone knows, and has been much in the news in recent weeks, both UNMOVIC [the UN Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission] and U.S. inspections—under David Kay in Iraq—appear to have resolved
the concerns that Iraq possesses biological weapons. But those inspections did show—and I think this is important
to bear in mind—clear evidence of not only a laboratory network but also procurement efforts aimed at reconstituting
Iraq’s biological weapons program in the future.
The other significant development with respect to BW proliferation in recent months of course has been the
Libyan announcement that it will comply with the BWC. That is also a very welcome development. Ultimately of
course we need to ensure that both the Iraqi program is not reconstituted in the future and that any required Libyan
disarmament efforts are carried out. And of course we need to address the concerns that have been expressed by the
U.S. and others about continuing BW programs in the other countries that I mentioned.
What about the CWC? I think the track record of participation in this treaty is even more impressive than with
respect to the Biological Weapons Convention. At entry into force in April of 1997—that’s less than seven years
ago—there were 87 states-parties. With the recent accession of Libya and Tuvalu, we are now at 160 states-parties to
the CWC; 160 countries have agreed now not to develop or produce or possess or use chemical weapons. As I
mentioned, unlike the BWC, the CWC does contain detailed declaration and inspection provisions that are designed
to ensure that its parties are meeting both their disarmament and their non-armament obligations. So you can look at
how countries have met these declaration and inspection requirements to get a more tangible feel for the impact of the
CWC.
So what has happened since entry into force of the CWC? Let me just run through a few data points that I think
are important.
First, five states-parties, including three who had not previously acknowledged possessing chemical weapons,
have declared CW stocks. These countries are the U.S., Russia, India, South Korea, and most recently Albania,
which apparently has some bulk agent that may or may not be militarily usable.
Since entry into force of the CWC, some 8,000 metric tons of chemical agent and approximately 2 million
munitions have been destroyed under international supervision. This represents approximately 11 percent of the
70,000 tons of chemical agents that have been declared under the treaty, and close to 25 percent of the 8.6 million
munitions or containers that have been declared.
Since entry into force, 11 states-parties have declared 61 current or past CW production facilities. These countries
are the U.S., Russia, India, South Korea, China, Iran, France, Japan, the U.K., Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Serbia and Montenegro. All 61 facilities have been inactivated. Two-thirds of them have either been destroyed or
converted to permitted purposes under international supervision.
Finally, over 1,600 inspections have been carried out at close to 700 sites in 58 countries. Two-thirds of these
inspections have been at chemical weapons-related facilities, (chemical weapons stockpile sites, chemical weapons
destruction facilities), and roughly a third of these inspections have been at industry facilities that handle chemicals
that could be used to make CW agents, the so-called scheduled chemicals.
Pretty impressive record, at least in terms of the numbers. But as is well known, the CWC, like the BWC, faces
some important challenges, and let me just quickly mention a few of them.
First, we have the continued existence of chemical weapons programs. Prior to the ratification of the CWC here
in the United States, U.S. officials said that there were some two-dozen countries that either had or were seeking
chemical weapons. In recent years, the number used is roughly a dozen. So we’ve seen a significant reduction in the
number of countries of CW proliferation concern, but still, a dozen countries is a dozen too many. Among the
countries that are outside the treaty, there are concerns about Iraq, Libya (until recently), Syria, North Korean, Egypt,
and Israel. Myanmar and Taiwan have also been mentioned as countries with probable chemical weapons programs.
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