test_pdf.pdf

MEETING
TODA
ODAY’S PROLIFERA
ROLIFERATION
CHALLENGES
MR. PONEMAN: This is exactly the kind of thing we need to get a grip on. I always thought that the ballistic
missile threat from North Korea was genuine. I didn’t think it was as urgent, and we believed it was not one that
should prevent us from solving the nuclear problem first.
That having been said, we were very clear at the time on the serious consequences of ballistic missile proliferation
from North Korea. I think we should be equally serious with them about it now. It’s harder because we have
this other very large agenda that’s in front of it, and Bob Einhorn could speak authoritatively to how close we came
to a more effective and perhaps verifiable kind of missile proliferation resolution with North Korea.
MR. GALLUCCI: Did we not have the Spanish interdict a shipment of North Korean SCUD-like missiles?
MR. PONEMAN: Right.
MR. GALLUCCI: And we let them go. So do you have a cut off here? If it’s extended range MRBM [mediumrange
ballistic missiles] we stop them with force, otherwise we let them go, or…
MR. PONEMAN: No. I would use the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] parameters as a critical
parameter. I would try to get the kind of international cooperation that the PSI is proposing. If I could get that kind
of support and if I could interdict the ship, I would.
MR. GALLUCCI: All right. And last and not least, we have the Nunn-Lugar question and whether that is
what you had in mind for Iraq. That is actually how I heard you.
MR. EINHORN: Actually it’s a program that’s underway. The State Department is putting in place a program
in Iraq. It’s analogous to the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and the one in Kiev. It’s
designed to find out who these scientists are and put them to gainful employment in civilian projects and try to
make sure they’re not peddling their expertise elsewhere.
Let me, if I can come back on the missile question. There’s no way you’re going to get a universal agreement to ban
all missiles above a certain range. That’s not going to happen. You’re also not going to be able to get a kind of missile
NPT where some countries can keep long-range missiles and others have to give them up. That’s not going to happen
either. You have to go at the missile problem in different ways. Part of it the U.S. does through dealing with each country
in turn. We negotiated an arrangement with South Korea on the range of its missiles. We tried to negotiate an agreement
with North Korea. We came pretty far, but we had other issues to work on.
This arrangement in Libya is going to bring down their missile capability to below the so-called MTCR
threshold, so ad hoc, country-by-country, is one element of it. Regionally is another. Various regions have considered
constraints on missiles. You’re not going to have a universal agreement on missiles.
MR. GALLUCCI: Let me thank the panel and thank you, audience.
39
39