test_pdf.pdf

ASSESSING
THE RECORD
OF ARMS
CONTROL
takes individual soldier’s decisions, individual platoon commanders, and those things.
That may not be a very good expression. The magnitude is so different and therefore people came to call them
weapons of mass destruction.
Indeed, there is also debate about the differences among the three categories, because nuclear, for instance, once
it’s used there is virtually no way to protect. There is enormous force of destruction. There is no way you can protect
yourself. But chemical or biological, with appropriate protective gear, you can still protect yourself even if the enemy
has used them. So some people argue that there is even first-class WMD and second-class WMD. They’re not weapons
of mass destruction. Analysis done by OTA [Office of Technology Assessments] in the early 1990s showed that
even under the most optimistic scenarios, an aircraft delivering nerve agent would only produce, in the best circumstances,
thousands of casualties, whereas the same aircraft delivering a payload of anthrax, for example, could
produce casualties up to 2 million people. So I think biological, clearly as I would define it, falls into the category of
weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons of course, as well. But we should be careful about sort of using that
expression as a sort of shorthand way of describing chemical weapons.
MR. NEWHOUSE: I’d agree with the inference in Greg Thielmann’s question that the term unconventional
weapons is far preferable to weapons of mass destruction.
Q: Avis Bohlen, retired State Department, former assistant secretary for arms control. I have just a couple of
comments. First of all, it seems to me that if we are to define a useful role for arms control in today’s world, we need
to recognize the limits of what arms control now and historically has been able to accomplish. Arms control does not
exist in a vacuum, its successes or failures are conditioned by the political context in which it lives. During the Cold
War, arms control never succeeded in controlling any weapons until the Cold War began to be over, at which point we
had all the Bush administration treaties, and I think that was the dominant fact—not the fact that we had a Republican
president and a Democratic Congress.
And similarly, I think the success of the NPT…has relied on the fact that most countries, even though many of
them would have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons, do not choose to do so because they do not feel compelled
for reasons of their own security, or other political reasons, or whatever. And what arms control does, both in the case
of the Cold War and the NPT, is to reinforce this political fact. But it cannot create the political fact by itself of countries
deciding they don’t need nuclear weapons. [Chemical and Biological weapons], the same thing. It seems to me the
BWC both reflects and reinforces the general consensus against BW, its use and/or its possession.
So what we’re left with are a handful of problem countries—you can call them rogue states, you can call them
other things because they’re not solely limited to the number of rogue states—but you have to start with an analysis
of the political reasons that have led these countries to try to develop these capabilities. And I think that’s absolutely
the essential point of departure, and I’m sure that none of the panelists would disagree with this, but I think all too
often we tend to behave as though arms control were an independent actor.
Second point, we’ve only talked about the treaties this morning but it seems to me in today’s world that treaties
are only one part of the picture, in particular the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction are absolutely essential
instruments, both for the reduction of nuclear weapons—the Russians never would have been able to implement the
START treaties without this—the importance to the Russian destruction of chemical weapons, the tightening of
nuclear controls, et cetera, et cetera. You all know that.
Just two final points. Elisa, it seems to me that there is room for a challenge inspection provision in the BWC. I
totally agree with you about not reviving the protocol —it was not going to fly anyway—but something that countries
could agree on, that would be a multilateral instrument would be a stronger challenge inspection provision. And
finally, let me associate myself wholeheartedly with Greg Thielmann about the use of the weapons of mass destruction—I
think the smushing together of all these things have permitted, as we have seen over the past year, a very
irresponsible use of the term WMD threat by the Bush administration and also by Tony Blair in England, and it is
essential to be clear that the threat is nuclear and maybe some categories of BW, but it is not most BW or CW. Thank
you.
MR. STEINBRUNER: Thank you, let me take that as a comment rather than a question and have the other
people at the microphone make their comments and questions before the panel begins to reply. So you’ll have to keep
in mind the things you want to respond to. You will have the last word.
Q: Nancy Gallagher, University of Maryland. My question is for Under-Secretary General Abe. You talked
about the very important historical relationship between the NPT and the CTBT, and I’m wondering whether you see
that relationship continuing to be equally strong, and in particular, if in the coming year, the administration—
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